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Abstract
We consider group formationwith asymmetric information. Agents have unveriﬁable
characteristics as well as the veriﬁable qualiﬁcationsrequired for memberships in groups.
The characteristics can be chosen, such as strategies in games, or can be learned, such
as skills required for jobs. They can also be innate, such as intelligence. We assume that
the unveriﬁable characteristics are observable ex post (after groups have formed) in the
sense that they may aﬀect the output and utility of other agents in the group. They are
not veriﬁable ex ante, which means that prices for memberships cannot depend on them,
and they cannot be used for screening members. The setup includes problems as diverse
as moral hazard in teams, screening on ability, and mechanism design. Our analysis,
including the deﬁnition of equilibrium and existence, revolves around the randomness
in matching. We characterize the limits on eﬃciency in such a general equilibrium, and
show that a suﬃciently rich set of group types can ensure the existence of an eﬃcient
equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
What determines the contracts, mechanisms, games, and other organizationalforms that are
used in an economy? What roledoes competitionplay in shaping incentivesand institutional
design? How does private information enter markets, and to what extent does competition
mitigate or magnify the ineﬃciencies that arise from asymmetric information? This paper
develops a model designed to address these questions.
Classical general equilibrium theory focuses on anonymous price-taking agents, typi-
cally ignoring any strategic eﬀects or incentives. Modern theory of institutions, contracts,
and mechanism design focuses on incentives and private information in isolation, typically
ignoring market forces that might alter organizational design. As a consequence, neither
can explain how incentives might inﬂuence markets or how competition might select among
institutions.
To address such issues, this paper develops a model that melds key aspects of contract
theory, mechanism design and game theory with general equilibrium theory. Agents interact
strategicallyin small groups, taking into account incentives and the eﬀects of their actions on
group outcomes, but trade anonymously in markets, taking prices as given. This allowsus to
study the interplay between market forces, private information, the provision of incentives,
and the structure of institutions, and to assess the role of markets in limiting ineﬃciencies
that stem from asymmetric information.
We take as a starting point models of group formation in markets developed in club
theory. In these models, agents choose memberships in ﬁnite groups (“clubs”), and also
trade private goods. Agents act as price takers in markets for memberships and goods.
Market clearing determines prices and the types of groups that emerge. These models
extend general equilibrium theory to include a vast array of economic and social interactions
that take place in groups. In particular, as emphasized by Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer and
Zame (2005), club theory provides a natural model of ﬁrms. Prescott and Townsend (2006)
and Zame (2007) expanded these ideas to incorporate more general contracting problems
with private information.
Our model extends the group formationmodel of Ellickson, Scotchmer, Grodal and Zame
(1999, 2005) (EGSZ below) to incorporate asymmetric information. Agents may have both
veriﬁable and unveriﬁable characteristics. Unveriﬁable characteristics can be either hidden
actions or hidden information. Thus they can be chosen, such as actions in games, learned,
such as skills required for jobs, or innate, such as intelligence. We assume that unveriﬁable
characteristics are observable ex post (after groups have formed) in the sense that they
may aﬀect the output and utility of other agents in the group. They are not veriﬁable ex
ante. Thus, prices for memberships cannot depend on them, and they cannot be used for
screening members. This framework includes problems as diverse as moral hazard in teams,signaling, screening, and mechanism design.
Because characteristics are unveriﬁable and groups form randomly, risk is a central
feature of the model, both aggregate risk and idiosyncratic risk. Once agents have chosen
memberships and strategies, a matching process determines who is matched with whom,
and therefore determines the unveriﬁable characteristics or strategies played in each agent’s
groups. We model this matching process as random, and construct the associated stochastic
processes so that the resulting distribution on possible matchings is uniform. Because the
model has a continuum of agents, there are subtleties in making this precise. To do so, we
adapt the construction of random matching in pairs in Duﬃe and Sun (2007) to the more
general group setting. This construction has several important consequences. First, it leads
to an exact law of large numbers. Second, it highlights the aggregate uncertainty that arises
from matching: each possible matching is a random outcome that applies to the economy
as a whole, and aﬀects each agent’s wealth and preferences for private goods.
In our model, aggregate risk is not ruled out by the law of large numbers. This con-
trasts with the approach of Prescott and Townsend (2006) and Zame (2007), who focus on
purely idiosyncratic risk. For example, Zame (2007) argues that, due to the law of large
numbers, aggregate consumption and production are deterministic, and as a consequence,
private-goods prices are deterministic. This is not true in our model. Agents’ outcomes
in the random matching are independent by construction, but individual demands may be
correlated by prices. The law of large numbers can be applied in aggregating individual de-
mands only after ﬁrst assuming that prices are constant. Instead of assuming this, we show
that constant prices materialize in equilibrium if a certain kind of insurance is oﬀered in the
market. With insurance, constant prices emerge as a conclusion, rather than an assumption.
Insurance also provides eﬃciency gains. Absent insurance, equilibrium prices need not be
constant, and trades in private goods can be ineﬃcient even if prices are constant.1
We use the matching process we construct to develop two equilibrium concepts, one in
which agents are sophisticated enough to realize that their chosen groups might not form,
and another in which they assume their demands for memberships are always met. The
second equilibrium notion is close in spirit to that of Zame (2007), under the additional
assumption that prices are constant across all matchings. We also develop a reﬁnement
that links the two equilibrium notions.
Our main results focus on the resulting eﬃciency in the trading of private goods and in
the formation of groups. The mere fact that agents choose their groups is a force toward
eﬃciency; that is probably the main message of club theory. On the other hand, most
games permit ineﬃcient outcomes, especially in the context of asymmetric information.
Since these two lenses give contradictory intuitions, how much eﬃciency can we expect?
Our main result shows that eﬃciency can be achieved by introducing a suﬃciently rich
1See example 6 below.
2set of group types using reporting mechanisms and residual claimants in the spirit of Maskin
(1999). Roughly, we show that if groups include appropriately designed mechanisms, there
are equilibrium states that replicate those that would arise if all strategies were veriﬁable.
These states are eﬃcient, provided eﬃciency can be achieved in deterministic states of the
economy.2
Over the past 25 years, there has been signiﬁcant interest in embedding private infor-
mation, particularly contracts, within the framework of markets and general equilibrium.
A number of papers have considered related themes in the context of particular appli-
cations. Examples include Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001), McAfee (1993), Peters
(1997, 2001), Bulow and Levin (2006), Magill and Quinzii (2005), Acemoglu and Simsek
(2010), and Legros and Newman (1996, 2008, 2009). In particular, Legros and Newman
(1996) study a general equilibrium model of the determination of monitoring and incentive
provision in ﬁrm formation. Using the speciﬁcity of their model, they determine a number
of important relationships between the distribution of wealth and the pattern of organi-
zational forms used in ﬁrms. Similarly to club theory, they view ﬁrms as ﬁnite groups of
agents engaged in an activity. Their model diﬀers from the clubs model of EGSZ (1999,
2005) and from our model in that they adopt a cooperative, core-based equilibrium concept.
A number of other papers focus instead on general competitive models incorporating
asymmetric information. This work can be grouped around three broad themes: lotteries
on consumption plans, clubs, and pooling. Our model touches on and extends each, but
also diverges in important ways. We discuss each in turn below.
The pioneering work of Prescott and Townsend (1984) formulated the trading of con-
tracts in general equilibrium by modeling incentive constraints as a restriction on contract
trades. Due to the resulting nonconvexities, agents are modeled not as choosing a partic-
ular consumption plan, but rather a lottery that is a distribution over consumption plans.
This is the framework adapted by Cole and Prescott (1997) to clubs, and by Prescott and
Townsend (2006), who extend the clubs model to accommodate unveriﬁable eﬀort in ﬁrms.
In these models, a lottery is oﬀered by an intermediary who serves a continuum of agents
(for simplicity, the whole economy). Because ﬁrms must serve a continuum of agents, the
model is no longer a foundation for competitive theory.3 We show instead how lotteries can
be introduced with ﬁnite group types.
We adapt the clubs framework of EGSZ (1999, 2005) instead of Cole and Prescott
(1997), and therefore our model shares features with that of Zame (2007). We diverge
by constructing the random group formation process and allowing for aggregate as well
2A subtlety is that, due to indivisibilities in consumption, eﬃciency may require randomization. We
comment on this further below.
3In addition, Rustichini and Siconolﬁ (2010) show that equilibria may fail to exist when incentive com-
patibility is taken as a constraint on lotteries the ﬁrm can oﬀer rather than a constraint on lotteries an agent
can purchase.
3as idiosyncratic uncertainty; in the basic equilibrium notion we adopt; and in focusing on
eﬃciency and the role of additional markets in enhancing eﬃciency. In particular, we show
that an insurance market can eliminate randomness in private-goods prices, that lotteries
can be modeled as group memberships, and that a suﬃciently rich set of groups embedding
appropriately designed mechanisms can lead to eﬃcient equilibria.
“Pooling” provides an alternative approach for incorporating contracts and asymmetric
informationin general equilibrium, as pioneered by Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005).
See also Bisin et al (2001), Minelli and Polemarchakis (2000), and Dubey and Geanakoplos
(2004). In these models, sellers deliver to a pool, and buyers buy from this pool. When the
goods diﬀer in quality, each buyer receives the average delivery or average quality from the
pool. Due to pooling, the market for goods will clear if the market for contracts clears, and
it is not necessary to match sellers with buyers. In contrast, our model allows trade with
unknown quality in ﬁnite trading groups, in which some members deliver goods, and other
members consume them. Membership prices establish payments from users to suppliers.
Some sellers with high-quality goods will stay oﬀ the market, but beliefs in equilibrium will
reﬂect the distribution of qualities that are supplied.
In section 2 we lay out the model. In section 3, we give two examples to illustrate the
model, emphasizing the diﬀerence between veriﬁability and observability. In section 4, we
formalizethe notion of random group formation. In section 5 we deﬁne our basic equilibrium
notion. In section 6 we deﬁne a second equilibrium notion with beliefs on membership
characteristics, and explore the connection to our basic equilibrium notion by means of a
reﬁnement. In section 7, we introduce insurance markets that smooth the consumption of
private goods, and establish a constrained version of the ﬁrst welfare theorem. In section
8, we illuminate the role of residual claimants in achieving eﬃciency, arguing that group
types with residual claimants will often drive out group types without residual claimants,
and give our main eﬃciency theorem. In section 9, we show that randomization can be
introduced as a choice variable through lotteries modeled as group types.
2 The Model
2.1 Private goods and Groups
There are N ≥ 1 divisible, publicly traded private goods.
Groups are described by a ﬁnite, exogenous set of group types, G. The group type
embeds organizational characteristics such as games, production technologies, transfers,
and many other aspects of the internal organization of a group; we elaborate below.4
4The notion of an exogenously given set of group types follows EGSZ (1999, 2001, 2005) who deﬁned
the group type by the characteristics of its members and organizational characteristics from a set. Our
formulation is equivalent, although less descriptive.
4A group type g ∈ G has associated to it a ﬁnite set M(g) designating memberships and,
implicitly, the number of members. A membership in group type g is denoted m ∈ M(g).
We write M for the set of memberships ∪g∈GM(g).
A membership list is an indicator function ` : M → {0,1}, with the interpretation that
`(m) = 1 means the agent consumes a membership of type m. Let Lists(M) denote the set
of lists. More generally, for any set C, we write Lists(C) for the set of indicator functions
on C, and given ` ∈ Lists(C) we write |`| for the number of elements c ∈ C such that
`(c) = 1.
In addition to their veriﬁable membership characteristics, encoded in m, group members
may have unveriﬁable characteristics or strategies. For each membership m ∈ M, let Sm be
the set of unveriﬁable characteristics that could be chosen in m. For example, in problems
with moral hazard, Sm may include unveriﬁable eﬀort, while in screening problems, Sm
may include unveriﬁable personal characteristics that are nevertheless observable and aﬀect
the utility of others. In normal-form games where m is the membership corresponding to
a particular player, the set Sm represents the set of actions available to that player. An
agent’s choice of an unveriﬁable characteristic in Sm may be constrained by the agent’s
consumption set; we formalize this below. For example, characteristics that are interpreted
as innate cannot be diﬀerent for a given agent in diﬀerent memberships.
Given a group type g ∈ G, let S(g) :=
Q
m∈M(g) Sm denote the possible strategy proﬁles
the members of g could adopt. Given a membership m ∈ M(g) and a strategy proﬁle
s ∈ S(g), write ˜ m = (m,s) for the resulting augmented membership in group type g. Let
˜ M(g) := {˜ m = (m,s) : m ∈ M(g) and s ∈ S(g)} represent the set of all possible augmented
memberships in a given group type g, and write ˜ M = ∪g∈G ˜ M(g) for the set of all augmented
memberships. An augmented membership list is an indicator function ˜ ` : ˜ M → {0,1}. Write
Lists( ˜ M) for the set of augmented membership lists.
Corresponding to each group type g is then a set of possible augmented group types,
depending on the strategieschosen by the agents who take memberships in the group. Given
g and s ∈ S(g), (g,s) is the corresponding augmented group type. Each augmented group
type (g,s) thus has the same set of memberships M(g) and one particular strategy proﬁle
s ∈ S(g).
Let |M(g)| denote the number of memberships in a group type g, or equivalently, in any
augmented group type (g,s) derived from g.
Groups may engage in productive activities, summarized by an input-output vector
which may depend on the unveriﬁable characteristics of group members. We capture this
by associating to each augmented group type (g,s) an input-output vector h(g,s) ∈ RN,
which is assumed to be veriﬁable. The input-output vector could arise, for example, from
the equilibrium of a game played within the group, or could simply be a required input
vector.
5The input-output vector of a group will be shared among its members according to
transfer functions tg : M(g)×RN → RN, for each g ∈ G. The vector tg(m,y) is transfered
to an agent holding membership m ∈ M(g) when the input-output vector produced by the
group is y. The transfers must allocate the input-output vector among the members, that
is, X
m∈M(g)
tg(m,y) = y for each y ∈ RN
While the transfers cannot depend on unveriﬁable characteristics directly, they will depend
on the unveriﬁable characteristics through the output of the group. In the augmented group
type (g,s), the transfer received by an agent holding membership m is tg(m,h(g,s)). The





The net payment that an agent receives when consuming an augmented list ˜ ` depends both
on these transfers, which are part of how the group type is deﬁned, and on the membership
prices discussed below, which are endogenous.
2.2 Agents
The set of agents is a nonatomic ﬁnite measure space (A,F,λ). That is, A is a set, F is a
σ-algebra of subsets of A, and λ is a non-atomic measure on F with λ(A) < ∞.
A complete description of an agent a ∈ A consists of a consumption set, endowments,
and a utility function; we deﬁne each of these in turn.






with generic element ˆ σ ∈ Σ. To simplify notation, this formulation requires each agent to
choose a strategy for each membership, even if he does not choose the membership.
Agents consume unveriﬁable augmented lists ˜ µ ∈ Lists( ˜ M). Let
U := {˜ µ : A → Lists( ˜ M)}
denote the set of all possible assignments of augmented lists to agents. The augmented lists
that agents consume in equilibrium will be constrained by the memberships and strategies
they choose, and also by the memberships and strategies chosen by others.
Agent a’s consumption set Xa ⊂ RN
+ × Lists(M) × Σ speciﬁes the triples (xa,µa,σa)
of private goods, lists of memberships, and strategies that the agent may choose. Each
6agent a ∈ A has an endowment (ea,0,σo
a) ∈ Xa and an ex post utility function ua : RN
+ ×
Lists( ˜ M) →R.
A central feature of the model is the underlying randomness arising from group forma-
tion. Private-goods consumption and prices can both be contingent on the realized state
in this model. Because the state space will be derived endogenously based on all agents’
membership and strategy choices, as part of the random group formation model, we de-
scribe only the ex post utility here. Below we assume that agents have beliefs over the state
space that arises, and choose contingent consumption bundles, memberships and strategies
to maximize expected ex post utility. We assume that neither the agent’s endowment nor
his feasibility constraints on consumption of private goods depends on the resolution of the
randomness.5
2.3 Economies
An economy E is a mapping a 7→ (Xa,ea,ua) for which:
• the consumption set mapping a 7→ Xa is a measurable correspondence such that
– for each a ∈ A, Xa ⊂ RN
+ × Lists(M) × Σ
– for each a ∈ A, if (xa,µa,σa) ∈ Xa and x0
a ≥ xa then (x0
a,µa,σa) ∈ Xa
– for each a ∈ A, if (xa,µa,σa) ∈ Xa and µ0
a ≤ µa then (xa,µ0
a,σa) ∈ Xa




• the endowment mapping a 7→ ea is an integrable function
• the ex-post utility mapping (a,x, ˜ `) 7→ ua(x, ˜ `) is a jointly measurable function of its
arguments, and for each a, ua is strictly monotone and continuous in x.
• ¯ e :=
R
A ea dλ(a) ￿ 0
Restrictions on the consumption set can be used to model, among other things, settings
in which some characteristics are innate. We assume that increased consumption of private
goods is always possible, while there is a ﬁxed bound on the number of memberships that
each agent can choose. To handle disequilibrium states where some chosen memberships
do not result in groups forming, we assume that if some memberships are dropped from
5In reality there may be settings where an agent’s feasible consumption of private goods would depend
on the characteristics that materialize in the agent’s groups. For example, the agent might have to buy locks
in order to protect against a roommate who turns out to be a kleptomaniac. For simplicity, we have chosen
to put this type of requirement into preferences rather than the consumption set.
7a feasible bundle, then the new bundle is still feasible. This is a restriction, but it makes
the deﬁnition of equilibrium tractable. The restriction can be removed in several ways,
for example, by deﬁning group types that combine memberships that must be consumed
together.
We follow EGSZ (1999) by deﬁning consistency of choices in terms of aggregates. Deﬁne
an aggregate membership vector to be an element ¯ µ ∈ RM. An aggregatemembership vector
¯ µ =
R
A µadλ(a) is consistent if for every group type g ∈ G, there is a real number α(g)
such that
¯ µ(m) = α(g) if m ∈ M(g)
Given a measurable set B ⊂ A and a measurable choice function µ : A → Lists(M), we
say that µ is consistent if the aggregate membership vector
R
A µa dλ(a) is consistent.
3 Two examples
Before continuing, we give two examples to illustrate the model. The ﬁrst example illus-
trates the diﬀerence between observability and veriﬁability. The second example shows how
the standard principal-agent problem can be embedded in a group model, and shows how
transfer payments can be used to solve the moral hazard problem.
Example 1: Observable but Unveriﬁable Characteristics
There is a single group type g with two memberships {m1,m2} ∈ M(g). A member
can have one of two unveriﬁable characteristics, b or c. Thus Sm1 = Sm2 = {b,c}, and
Σ = {(b,b),(b,c),(c,b),(c,c)}. The utility of each member depends on all the members’
unveriﬁable characteristics, revealed after the group forms. These characteristics are ob-
servable after the group has formed, but not before. Thus, membership prices and choices
cannot depend on them.
Let the set of agents be A = [0,1]. The characteristics b and c are understood to be
innate, and we assume that there is a proportion ρ ∈ (0,1) such that agents a ∈ [0,ρ)
have characteristic b, that is, are constrained by their consumption sets to choose strategy
(b,b). Similarly, agents a ∈ [ρ,1] are constrained to choose strategy (c,c). We adopt the
shorthand notations ˜ mbb, ˜ mcc, ˜ mbc, and ˜ mcb for the augmented group types where both
members have unveriﬁable characteristic b, both have characteristic c, or one member has
each characteristic.
Agents are limited to a single membership, so M = 1, and there is a single private good
of which each agent has an endowment e ∈ R+. Agents a ∈ [0,ρ), who have characteristic
8b, have ex-post utility function vb given by




x − 1 if ˜ ` = 0
6 + x if ˜ `(˜ mbb) = 1
x if ˜ `(˜ mbc) = 1 or ˜ `( ˜ mcb) = 1
Agents a ∈ [ρ,1], who have characteristic c, have ex-post utility function vc given by




x − 1 if ˜ ` = 0
x if ˜ `(˜ mbc) = 1 or ˜ `(˜ mcb) = 1
2 + x if ˜ `(˜ mcc) = 1
Thus for any ﬁxed consumption level x, agents get more utility if matched with like agents.
If the characteristicswere veriﬁable and could be encoded into the memberships, the eﬃcient
matching would result in as many homogeneous groups as possible.
In equilibrium, which we formalize in section 5, membership prices must sum to zero
within each group. Since the memberships are indistinguishable in this example, each
membership price will be zero in equilibrium. Thus, we can think of agents simply choosing
with whom to match. The question is whether an equilibrium will result in eﬃcient matches
of like with like.
When an agent takes a membership, he cannot observe the unveriﬁable characteristic of
the other member, but has beliefs about its distribution. For each s1 ∈ Sm1, let f(s1;m2)
denote the probability an agent holding membership m2 ∈ M(g) assigns to being matched
with an agent whose characteristic is s1. Deﬁne f(s2;m1) symmetrically for s2 ∈ Sm2.
We ﬁrst show that there are beliefs that support an equilibrium in which half of the
agentswith each unveriﬁable characteristictake each membership. Suppose agents’ common
beliefs are f(b;m) = ρ and f(c;m) = 1 − ρ for each m ∈ M(g). Given these beliefs, all
agents are indiﬀerent among all memberships. Given this indiﬀerence, choices such that
half the agents with each characteristic take each membership are optimal, and generate a
distribution over augmented group types that agrees with f. This will be an equilibrium in
our model. Nonetheless, it is not Pareto optimal, and is dominated by the matchings that
would arise if characteristics were veriﬁable.
Now consider enlarging the set of group types. Let G = {gbb,gbc,gcb,gcc}, where each
group type has two memberships {m1,m2} as before. These new group types are identical
in every way except their labels, which can serve as a coordinating mechanism.
In the economy with the enlarged set of group types, there is still an equilibrium where
no coordination takes place. Agents ignore the labels, have the beliefs given above for each
group type, and are still matched randomly in groups of like or unlike agents according to
the population distribution.
There is a second equilibrium, however, in which the expanded set of group types coor-
dinates the agents’ beliefs, hence choices. In this equilibrium, agents a ∈ [0,ρ), those with
9strategy (b,b), take memberships in M(gbb), with half taking each membership. Agents
a ∈ [ρ,1], those with strategy (c,c), take memberships in M(gcc), again with half taking
each membership. No one takes memberships in the mixed groups gbc or gcb. Membership
prices are still zero. This equilibrium, which results in an allocation that Pareto dominates
the previous one, can be sustained by the following beliefs:
f(b;m) = 1 if m ∈ M(gbb)
f(c;m) = 1 if m ∈ M(gcc)
f(c;m) = f (b;m) =
1
2
if m ∈ M(gbc) or m ∈ M(gcb)
It may not always possible to ﬁnd an equilibrium that screens with respect to the
unveriﬁable characteristics. Suppose, for example, that the utility received by agents with
strategy (c,c) is reversed for homogeneous groups and mixed groups, that is, suppose that
vc(x, ˜ `) = 2 + x if ˜ `(mbc) = 1 or ˜ `(˜ mcb) = 1 and vc(x, ˜ `) = x if ˜ `(˜ mcc) = 1. Then optimal
screening cannot be achieved by introducing new group types. In addition, a screening
equilibrium is not always superior; see example 11. ♦
Example 2: A Standard Principal-Agent Problem
There is one type of ﬁrm with two memberships, a worker w and a principal p. The
principal has a “null” strategy so while the worker’s action can be either low or high eﬀort,
{e`,eh}. If the worker works hard, the output is higher:
h(g,(so,eh)) = yh > y` = h(g,(so,e`))
The internal transfers give all the output to the worker:
tg (w,y) = y,tg (p,y) = 0 for y = y`,yh
Let A = [0,5], and suppose that agents a ∈ [0,3) are constrained to take memberships
as workers, that is, they cannot take principal memberships, while agents a ∈ [3,5] are
constrained to take memberships as principals.
We assume that all reservation utilities are zero. Principals have utility equal to their
consumptions of the private good, and workers have the following utility functions
va (x,e`) = va (x − 1,eh) if a ∈ [0,1)
va (x,e`) = va (x − 3,eh) if a ∈ [1,3)
where va is increasing in the ﬁrst component. Thus, all agents dislike eﬀort, but eﬀort is
costlier for those in [1,3).
Assume that 1 < yh −y` < 3. Then it is eﬃcient for low type workers, those in [1,3), to
exert low eﬀort e`, while high type workers, those in [0,1), exert high eﬀort eh. We argue
that this is what will happen in equilibrium.
10For any membership price q(w), an agent in [0,1) will choose high eﬀort because
va(−q(w) + tg(w,y`),e`) < va(−q(w) + tg(w,yh) − 1,eh). An analogous calculation shows
that an agent in [1,3) will choose low eﬀort. Membership fees in each group sum to zero,
so the worker’s loss is the principal’s gain: q(p) = −q(w).
We claim there is an equilibrium with membership prices q(p) = −y` and q(w) = y`. At
this equilibrium, all potential principals are in ﬁrms, all high-type workers are in ﬁrms, and
half the low-type workers are in ﬁrms. Principals get utility equal to y`, which exceeds their
reservation payoﬀ since they are in short supply. Low-type workers get zero consumption,
since they are in excess supply, and high-type workers get rents equal to yh − y` − 1, since
they are in short supply among agents who will be matched. This is an equilibrium because
no principal or worker can improve utility by choosing to shed or add memberships, and
no worker can improve utility by choosing a diﬀerent eﬀort level. Equilibrium is ﬁrst-best
eﬃcient. ♦
4 Random Matching
A key aspect of our model is the matching process that underlies group formation. We
imagine that once agents have made membership and strategy choices, groups form that
are consistent with those choices. Since each agent’s utility and income may depend on the
outcome of matching, the agent’s expected utility (hence membership and strategy choices)
depend on the probabilities of diﬀerent matchings.6
Loosely, we assume that matching is random and uniform, so that every matching con-
sistent with agents’ choices is equally likely. There are mathematical subtleties in deﬁning
such a process precisely, due to the well-known issues stemming from a continuum of agents,
and a continuum of random variables. The matching process we use for groups is adapted
from the construction of Duﬃe and Sun (2007) for matching in pairs. This gives a precise
meaning to random and uniform matching in a continuum economy, and leads to a natural
law of large numbers.
To make this precise, let M be a ﬁnite index set and let {Am ⊂ A|m ∈ M} be measurable
sets of agents such that Am ∩ Am0 = ∅ for m 6= m0 ∈ M. In our model, M represents
memberships in a given group type.7 Write AM=
Q





−m is a list of |M| − 1 agents.
6This is a major diﬀerence between the model here and EGSZ (1999), where the matching does not matter,
provided the matching is consistent as to veriﬁable characteristics. Even there, though, the matching could
matter in the sense of “sunspots” for coordinating on diﬀerent private-goods prices.
7If a given agent has two memberships in a given group type, then he appears in two sets Am and Am0.
Implicitly, we imagine the copies of the agent to be distinct agents when deﬁning the correpsonding group
matching. When matching is random and uniform, any given agent will be matched with himself in a group
with probability zero, so we can ignore such groups.
11Deﬁnition 1 A group matching is a function Ψ : AM → {0,1} such that for every m ∈ M
and for every b ∈ Am, there exists at most one a ∈ AM such that Ψ(a) = 1 and am = b.
If Ψ(a) = 0 for all a ∈ AM such that am = b, then b is unmatched.
If Ψ(a) = 1 then a ∈ AM is a match.
Given a group matching Ψ, for each m ∈ M, let the function gm : Am → AM
−m ∪ ∅
describe the matches for the agents in Am. Then gm(b) = ∅ if b ∈ Am is unmatched, and if
b is matched, so gm(b) 6= ∅, he is matched with gm(b) ∈ AM
−m.
If the measures of the sets {Am ⊂ A|m ∈ M} are diﬀerent, then not all agents will
be matched. The measure of the subset of agents in Am who are matched will be ζ :=
minm∈M λ(Am). For each m ∈ M, set
ζ (m) :=
(
1 if ζ = 0
λ(Am)−ζ
λ(Am) otherwise
The values {ζ (m)|m ∈ M} are the no-match probabilities associated with the collection
{Am ⊂ A|m ∈ M}.
In our model, the sets {Am ⊂ A|m ∈ M} will represent the agents who have chosen the
various memberships in a given group type g ∈ G. The characteristics of these agents
will be deﬁned by their strategy choices. In this section, we simply imagine that agents
have characteristics speciﬁed by functions αm : Am → Sm, each m ∈ M, where the sets
{Sm : m ∈ M} represent characteristics that could be attached to the membership m. We
use α−m to refer to {αm0 : m0 ∈ M, m0 6= m}.
For each sm ∈ Sm, let Am(sm) := {a ∈ Am | αm(a) = sm}. We deﬁne pm to be the




if λ(Am) > 0
Similarly, we deﬁne p−m to be the relative frequencies of strategies in matches, excluding
the member from Am. To account for the possibility that an agent is not matched, we add
the “null” characteristic ∅. Let S−m :=
Q









pm0(sm0) if s = {sm0}m0∈M\m ∈ S−m
ζ (m) if s = ∅
These deﬁnitions describe matching and relative frequencies of characteristics, but do
not describe what it means to match randomly. Intuitively, we assume matching is random
and uniform; thus we will want p−m to be the probability distribution on characteristics
in a match, from the perspective of the mth member, for each membership m. Part of the
12contribution of this section is to show that a state space and random variables describing
matchings can be constructed such that this is the case.
To formalize this, we start by letting V denote a state space and (V,V,ν) an associated
probability space. For now we take these as given, so that we can deﬁne the notation needed
to describe random matching. In the construction of random group formation models, this
probabilityspace will be determined endogenously, as a function of membership and strategy
choices of the agents.
For each b ∈ Am, m ∈ M, let gm(b,·) : V → AM
−m ∪ ∅ be a random variable that gives
the match for agent b, and let ω(b,·) : V → S−m ∪∅ be the corresponding random variable
that describes the characteristics in agent b’s random match. Thus
ω(b,v) =
￿
α−m ◦ gm(b,v) if gm(b,v) 6= ∅
∅ if gm(b,v) = ∅
Then ω (b,·) = ∅ if and only if agent b is not matched. If b is matched, then gm (b,v) speciﬁes
the names of the agents in his match, and α−m ◦ gm(b,v) speciﬁes their characteristics.
Deﬁnition 2 Let {Am ⊂ A|m ∈ M} be measurable subsets of agents, and {ζ (m)|m ∈ M}
be the associated no-match probabilities. Let (V,V,ν) be a probability space. A random
group matching is a function Ψ : AM × V → {0,1} such that:
(i) for every v ∈ V , Ψ(·,v) is a group matching
(ii) for almost every v ∈ V ,
λ({a ∈ Am | a is unmatched in Ψ(·,v)}) = ζ (m) for each m ∈ M
(iii) for each m ∈ M and almost every b ∈ Am, p−m is the distribution of ω(b,·)
(iv) for each m ∈ M and almost every b,b0 ∈ Am, ω(b,·) ,ω (b0,·) are independent.
To use these notions in our model, we imagine that the list and strategy choices (µ,σ)
are given. The list choices determine the sets of agents who might be matched in any given
group type, and the strategychoices determine the corresponding distributionof unveriﬁable
characteristics. This naturally leads to the notion of random matchings that are consistent
with population choices (µ,σ).
Deﬁnition 3 For g ∈ G, a random group matching Ψg : AM(g) × V → {0,1} is consistent
with (µ,σ) if
(i) for each m ∈ M(g), Am = {a ∈ A | µa(m) = 1};
13(ii) for each m ∈ M(g) and a ∈ Am, αm(a) = sm iﬀ σa,m = sm.
Deﬁnition 4 A random group formation model consistent with (µ,σ) is a probability space
(V,V,ν) and a collection of maps {Ψg : g ∈ G} such that
(i) {Ψg : g ∈ G} are random group matching functions consistent with (µ,σ).
(ii) for every m ∈ Mg,m0 ∈ Mg0 and for almost every b ∈ Am, b0 ∈ Am0, the random
variables ω(b,·) and ω(b0,·) are independent.
Henceforth, we writeR(µ,σ) for a random group formationmodel consistent with (µ,σ),
and write (V,V,P(µ,σ)) for the associated probability space.
For a standard pairwise matching problem, or equivalently, a setting with a single group
type with two memberships, Duﬃe and Sun (2007) show that such a random group forma-
tion model exists. Our notion of random group formation is the natural extension of this
construction to multiple group types with an arbitrary ﬁnite number of members in each
group type.
Theorem 4.1 For every (µ,σ) there exists a random group formation model consistent
with (µ,σ).
We omit the proof, which mimics the proof in Duﬃe and Sun (2007, Theorem 2.6) for
the case of pairwise matching.
Assignments ˜ µ ∈ U are random variables on the probability space (V,V,P(µ,σ)). Each
v ∈ V induces a random group matching {Ψg(·,v) : g ∈ G}, and each random matching
generates an assignment of augmented lists ˜ µ ∈ U. However, the assignment ˜ µ contains less
information, since the assignment of augmented lists ˜ µ is preserved if two agents with the
same augmented lists, ˜ µa = ˜ µa0, trade places in all groups. Thus diﬀerent random matchings
can lead to the same assignment of augmented lists ˜ µ, but not vice versa. Nevertheless, in
the following we will often use the word “matching” interchangeably for the assignment ˜ µ.
We let ˜ µr(v) denote the random assignment ˜ µ that is realized at a state v. Thus agent
a’s assignment in the state v is denoted ˜ µr
a (v). The probability of a random assignment
˜ µ is P (µ,σ)(V (˜ µ)) where V (˜ µ) := {v ∈ V : ˜ µr (v) = ˜ µ}. The probability of a given
˜ µa ∈ Lists( ˜ M) is understood analogously.
An important consequence of the construction of random group formation models is
that it leads to an exact law of large numbers governing the distribution of lists ˜ µa for every
a ∈ A.
14To make this precise, using the notation set out in deﬁnition 3, the implied no-match





λ(Am) if λ(Am) > 0
1 if λ(Am) = 0
When an agent with membership m and characteristic sm is matched, the distribution of
other members’ characteristics, s−m ∈ S−m, is independent of the member’s own charac-
teristic sm. We can thus write the probability that the agent ends up in the augmented










Thus, when the population choices are (µ,σ), all agents who choose the list and strategy
(`, ˆ σ) ∈ Lists(M) × Σ face the probability distribution on augmented lists ˜ ` given by:8










s−m∈S−m(g) ˜ `(m,(s−m,ˆ σm))=0}
ζ(m;µ) (2)
For memberships m such that `(m) = 1, the second line in (2) gives the probability of not
matching. The ﬁrst line gives the probability of the particular match that is made (where
˜ `(m,(s−m, ˆ σm)) = 1).
Conditional on being matched in each membership in `, these probabilities become






We refer to ¯ φ(µ,σ), η(µ,σ) and ¯ η(µ,σ) as the empirical distributions, since they are derived
from the choices made by agents in the population. That these empirical distributions are
generated by the random matching model is an important consequence of the exact law of
large numbers, recorded below.9
Theorem 4.2 Let (V,V,P(µ,σ)) be the probability space associated with the random group
formation model R(µ,σ). For almost every pair of agents a,b ∈ A, the random variables
˜ µr
a (·) and ˜ µr
b (·) are pairwise independent and identically distributed, with distribution η(µ,σ)
on Lists( ˜ M) given by (2).
8We take the product over the empty set to be 1 in this expression.
9This is analogous to Duﬃe and Sun (2007, Theorem 2.6).
155 Group Equilibrium
We assume that agents are price-takers in membership and private goods markets, and
choose actions or characteristics strategically. Agents’ choices depend both on membership
and private goods prices, and on the membership and strategy choices of other agents. In
particular, agents understand the random group formation model R(µ,σ). Agents’ mem-
bership and strategy choices are then a best response to the choices of other agents, given
their knowledge of the matching process. Although this is a familiar idea in game theory, it
creates a tension with the general equilibrium idea that agents’ demands do not depend on
choices of other agents or whether their demands can be satisﬁed. In section 6, we assume
instead that agents choose memberships on the assumption (perhaps incorrect) that their
demands for memberships will always be met. We develop a reﬁnement below that connects
these two equilibrium concepts.
Let (RN
+)V be endowed with the product topology.
A state is a measurable mapping (x,µ,σ) : A → (RN
+)V × Lists(M)×Σ, together with
a random group formation model R(µ,σ).
A state (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ) is feasible if for almost every a ∈ A, (xa(v),µa,σa) ∈ Xa for
P(µ,σ)-almost all v,
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for P(µ,σ)-almost all v.
Given (µ,σ) and an associated random group formation model R(µ,σ) with probability
space (V,V,P(µ,σ)), we assume that agents hold beliefs {Pa,a ∈ A} on (V,V). We also as-
sume that each agent evaluates combinations of state-contingent private goods, membership
and strategy choices by expected ex post utility, given Pa. When evaluating deviations from
membership and strategy choices, we assume that each agent takes membership and strategy
choices of other agents as given, as well as the random group formation model R(µ,σ). We
assume that each agent has beliefs over the characteristics that will materialize in groups,
as a function of his membership and strategy choices. We let ˜ `a(`, ˆ σ) denote the correspond-
ing random variable on Lists( ˜ M) for each a, and let na(·;`,ˆ σ) ∈ ∆(Lists( ˜ M)) denote the
beliefs of agent a given his membership and strategy choices (`, ˆ σ). We require these beliefs
to coincide in equilibrium with the empirical frequencies generated in the random group
formation model.
To allow for the possibility that not all chosen memberships result in matches, we let





˜ `(m,s) for each m ∈ M
Thus `(˜ `)(m) = 1 if and only if there is some s such that ˜ `(m,s) = 1, that is, if the
membership m is part of some augmented membership (m,s) in the support of ˜ `.
Deﬁnition 5 A group equilibrium consists of a feasible state (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ), beliefs




￿V with p 6= 0, where p is measurable, and
membership prices q ∈ RM such that (E1)-(E3) hold:




(E2) Optimization by agents: For almost every a ∈ A, if (x0
a(v),µ0
a,σ0
a) ∈ Xa for








a(v), ˜ `)dPa(v) >
Z
V
ua(xa (v), ˜ µr
a (v))dPa(v)





a(v) + q · `(˜ `) > p(v) · ea + p(v) · (˜ µv
r (v)t) for every v ∈ V 0
(E3) Beliefs are correct: For almost every a ∈ A, Pa = P(µ,σ) and na(·;`,ˆ σ) =
η(µ,σ)(·;`,ˆ σ) for each (`, ˆ σ).
In group equilibrium, prices, budget sets and demand for private goods depend on the
state v. An agent’s budget set is aﬀected not only by veriﬁable memberships, but also by
the unveriﬁable characteristics of other members, which are random. We denote an agent’s
budget set by
B(a,p,q;Pa,na) := {(xa,`, ˆ σ) : (xa(v),`,ˆ σ) ∈ Xa, p(v) · xa(v) + q · `(˜ `) ≤ p(v) · ea + p(v) · (˜ `t)
for Pa-almost all v ∈ V and every ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M) such that na(˜ `;`, ˆ σ) > 0}
Denote the optimizing choices of private goods, memberships, and strategies by





˜ `∈Lists( ˜ M)
na(˜ `;µa,σa)ua(xa(v), ˜ `)dPa(v)
s.t. (xa,µa,σa) ∈ B(a,p,q;Pa,na)
17Of this optimizing triple, let ξa(p,q;Pa,na) denote the demand for private goods. Then





These deﬁnitions make clear that agents can be thought of as making their choices in
two steps, ﬁrst choosing their memberships and strategies at the prices q, while having
rational expectations regarding p, and then choosing their consumptions of private goods
after the state v is realized and the prices p(v) are known. Equivalently, agents have
contingent consumption plans for private goods, contingent on the realizations of v and
˜ `. Thus the state and matching aﬀect the choices of private goods both directly through
agents’ preferences and indirectly through their budget sets.
A group equilibrium trivially exists, namely, one in which no groups form, since our
assumptions are strong enough to guarantee that there is an equilibrium in the exchange
economy with no groups. In that equilibrium, no agent can improve utility by choosing
a membership, because no agent believes the membership would result in formation of a
group. Typically there will be equilibria, or at least quasi-equilibria, with groups as well.10
To focus on non-trivial equilibria, we develop a reﬁnement that uses expanded economies
in which at least a small mass of every type of group alwaysforms. The limit of the expanded
economies corresponds to the real economy, and the reﬁnement selects equilibria that can
be approximated arbitrarily closely by equilibria in expanded economies. In the limit, some
of the group types may vanish. For an equilibrium with no groups of some types to survive
this reﬁnement, agents must hold common beliefs on strategies of other members such that
they do not wish to join the types of groups that have vanished.
To formalize, let E be a group economy. Fix ε > 0, and let Aε
m ⊂ R be disjoint intervals
of length ε for each m ∈ M. Set





The agent space for the ε-expansion Eε is then (Aε,Fε,λε), where Fε is the σ-algebra
generated jointly by F and the Lebesgue measurable subsets of ∪m∈MAε
m, and λε is λ on
A and Lebesgue measure on ∪m∈MAε
m.
We will say that Eε is an ε-expanded group economy if consumption sets, endowments
and utility functions of agents in A are the same in the expanded economy Eε as in the





10In group-formation models, inputs required for groups can exhaust the endowments of members, who
may end up in the zero-wealth position. Guaranteeing that a quasi-equilibrium is an equilibrium therefore
requires more assumptions than in an exchange economy. We return to this issue below.
18• for each m ∈ M, agents a ∈ Aε
m have consumption sets
Xa = RN
+ × {` ∈ Lists(M) : `(m) = 1 and |`| = 1} × {σε
a},
• the map a 7→ eε
a is integrable
• the ex-post utility mapping (a,x, ˜ `) 7→ uε
a(x, ˜ `) is a jointly measurable function of its
arguments, and for each a, uε
a is monotone and continuous in x
In this economy, agents a ∈ Aε
m are “endowed” with membership m and strategy σε
a.
Thus in an ε-expanded group economy, a mass of each group type of at least ε will always
form, with some distribution of characteristics inﬂuenced by the ﬁxed map σε. This gives
each agent an empirical basis for forming beliefs over matchings. Choices of memberships
and strategies will then be based on these beliefs in an equilibrium.
Our objective is to study a class of equilibria that can be represented as limits of equi-
libria in these expansions as ε → 0. To ensure that equilibrium consumptions and prices are
comparable across diﬀerent expansions, we focus on a subclass of equilibria in the economies
Eε that are invariant to these expansions.
For each ˜ µ ∈ U and ε > 0, let
Uε (˜ µ) := {˜ µε : Aε → Lists( ˜ M), ˜ µε
a = ˜ µa for each a ∈ A}
V (˜ µ) := {v ∈ V : ˜ µr
a (v) = ˜ µa for each a ∈ A}
V ε(˜ µ) := {vε ∈ V ε : ˜ µr
a (vε) = ˜ µa for each a ∈ A}
If v0 ∈ V ε0
(˜ µ) and v00 ∈ V ε00
(˜ µ), the assignments ˜ µr(v0) and ˜ µr(v00) are indistinguishable for
agents in the original economy.
Say that x↓ ∈ (RN
+)V is a reduction of x ∈ (RN
+)V ε
if x↓(v) = x(vε) whenever vε ∈ V ε(˜ µ)
and v ∈ V (˜ µ), for each ˜ µ ∈ U.
Given ε > 0, say that the equilibrium (xε,µε,σε),R(µε,σε),(pε,qε),{Pε
a,nε
a,a ∈ A} in
Eε is expansion-invariant if pε and xε
a for each a ∈ A have reductions. Expansion invariance
restricts attention to equilibria that are equivalent for agents in the original economy (that
is, agents in A) whenever the random matching gives them the same augmented lists. With
expansion invariance, agents’ consumption bundles, as well as the prices they face, depend
only on ˜ µ, the assignment to agents in A.11
Deﬁnition 6 A group equilibrium (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ),(p,q),{Pa,na,a ∈ A} in E is group




11This raises the question whether such equilibria exist. Lemma 6.1 in section 6 shows that the restriction
to constant prices on any set of matchings with positive measure is possible by the law of large numbers. It
follows from Theorem 6.1 that such an equilibrium exists for each expanded economy E
ε.









a,a ∈ A} is an expansion-invariant group equi-
librium in Eε for each ε.
Group perfect equilibria exist under our assumptions, but we defer the proof to the
following section, where we relate group perfectness to the second equilibrium notion we
study.
We close this section by giving two examples to illustrate the eﬀects that matchings may
have on markets and prices. Diﬀerent matchings of agents into groups can create diﬀerent
market conditions. Example 3 illustrates how, as a consequence, prices may be diﬀerent at
diﬀerent matchings. Example 4 shows that variation in prices can be a source of ineﬃciency
from an ex ante perspective, even though trades in private goods are alwayseﬃcient ex post.
Example 3: Matching and a continuum of prices
Suppose there are two private goods. Every agent’s endowment is ea = (1,1). It is
convenient to normalize and write the prices as p = (1,p2). A single group type g has two
memberships m1,m2 ∈ M(g). In each of these memberships agents can take the unveriﬁable
characteristic b or c, so Sm1 = Sm2 = {b,c}.
Each agent’s consumption set allows a single membership. We assume, as in example
1, that characteristics are innate, with agents a ∈ [1,1/2) constrained to choose b in every
membership, while agents a ∈ [1/2,1] are constrained to choose c. Utilities are given by
ua(x, ˜ `) =
￿
xa
1x2 if ˜ `(m1,bb) = ˜ `(m2,bb) = 0
x2a
1 x2 if ˜ `(m1,bb) = 1 or ˜ `(m2,bb) = 1
By this speciﬁcation, the agents with unveriﬁable characteristic c, a ∈ [1/2,1], have the
utility function xa
1x2. Agents a ∈ [0,1/2) with characteristic b have utility for private goods
that depends on whether or not they are matched with a like agent. When matched with
another b agent, these agents have an agent-speciﬁc increase in marginal utility for good 1.
Diﬀerent matchings ˜ µ therefore lead to diﬀerent demands for private goods, which in turn
lead to diﬀerent equilibrium prices.
We focus on matchings ˜ µ that generate a measure 1/8 of augmented groups (g,bb),
since the total measure of groups is 1/2 if everyone joins a group, and of those, 1/4 will
be (g,bb). More speciﬁcally, for a ﬁxed β ≤ 1/4, consider matchings ˜ µ such that agents
a ∈ Aβ := (β,β + 1/4) form the groups of augmented type (g,bb).
Because every agent is indiﬀerent between the two memberships and groups make zero
proﬁt, the equilibrium membership prices must be q = 0. To calculate equilibrium private-
















if a ∈ A\Aβ


























This equation deﬁnes a continuous implicit function p2 (β) that is decreasing in β, as the
derivative of the left hand side with respect to β is positive. Thus, there are a continuum
of equilibrium prices indexed by β. ♦
Example 4: Ineﬃcient trading due to random prices
This example illustratesthe ineﬃciencies that can arise when prices vary with matchings.
We start with an ordinary exchange economy with two types of agents having strictly
concave utility functions u0,u1 : RN
+ → R and endowments e0,e1 ∈ RN
+ respectively.














There is a single group type g ∈ G with two memberships m1,m2 ∈ M(g), and a single
(null) characteristic Sm1 = Sm2 = {so}. Ex-post utility is independent of membership
characteristics, and given by
ua(x, ˜ `) =
￿
u0(x) if a ∈ [0,1/2)
u1(x) if a ∈ [1/2,1]
Membership prices will be zero in any equilibrium, and agents will always be indiﬀerent
over memberships. We focus on equilibria in which all agents choose memberships; let (µ,σ)
represent equilibrium choices. Fix α ∈ (0,1) and let {V 0,V 00} be a partition of V such that
P (µ,σ)(V 0) = α and P (µ,σ)(V 00) = 1−α. An equilibrium with variation in private goods
prices can be constructed in which private goods prices and consumptions (pα,xα) satisfy
(pα(v),xα(v)) =
￿
(p∗,x∗) for each v ∈ V 0
(p†,x†) for each v ∈ V 00
To see that the resulting allocation is ineﬃcient, let y0,y1 be the average consumptions:
y0 = αx
†




1 + (1 − α)x∗
1
21The consumptions (y0,y1) are feasible, since they integrate to the aggregate endowment.
Moreover, by strict concavity,
u0 (y0) > αu0(x
†
0) + (1 − α)u0 (x∗
0)
u1 (y1) > αu1(x
†
1) + (1 − α)u1 (x∗
1)
Thus the feasible allocation (y0,y1) Pareto dominates the equilibrium allocation xα.
As this example illustrates, private goods can be ineﬃciently distributed in an equilib-
rium in which prices vary with v. Moreover, even though equilibria with random prices may
be ineﬃcient, there is not necessarily an equilibrium with constant prices that is Pareto su-
perior. In this example, none of the three possible equilibria with constant prices is Pareto
superior to xα. ♦
6 Equilibrium with Beliefs on Membership Characteristics
The existence of a group equilibrium is trivial because there is always an equilibrium with
no groups in which “no one goes there because no one goes there.” In this section, we
consider a second equilibrium concept, in which agents assume (perhaps incorrectly) that
their chosen memberships can always be accommodated. We show that equilibria of this
type also exist and, with constant prices, are equivalent to group-perfect equilibria. As a
corollary, this yields the existence of group perfect equilibria as well.
As before, we require that beliefs on membership characteristics must agree in equilib-
rium with the conditional distribution on characteristics generated by the random group
formation model, for group types that form. For groups that do not form in equilibrium,
beliefs on membership characteristics cannot be derived from the random group formation
model. For such groups, we simply require that agents hold common beliefs over member-
ship characteristics that rationalize their choices not to join these groups.12 When agents
hold beliefs on membership characteristics, they are only partially sophisticated. On one
hand, they are assumed to know the probability distribution on the characteristics that will
materialize in their groups, conditional on the groups forming, but on the other hand, do
not understand that the groups might not form.







Then beliefs on membership characteristics are an element f ∈ F, where f(s−m;m) denotes
the probability that each agent assigns to ending up in augmented membership (m,s) when
12The restriction to common beliefs is not necessary, and is done simply to save notation. We show that
there is always an equilibrium even with this more restrictive assumption.
22he chooses (and is matched in) a membership m ∈ M(g) and plays strategy sm. Given
f, for each (`, ˆ σ) ∈ Lists(M) × Σ, let n(·;`, ˆ σ,f) ∈ ∆(Lists( ˜ M)) be the corresponding
distribution on augmented lists, deﬁned by







The distributions f and n are arbitrary for the moment, although in equilibrium we
will require that they coincide with the empirical distributions ¯ φ(µ,σ) and ¯ η(µ,σ) for all
memberships having positive match probabilities.
Deﬁnition 7 A group equilibrium with beliefs on membership characteristics consists of
a feasible state (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ), private goods prices p ∈ (RN
+)V with p 6= 0 such that p
is measurable, membership prices q ∈ RM, beliefs {Pa,a ∈ A} and beliefs on membership
characteristics f such that (E1), (E4) and (E5) hold, where:
(E4) Optimization by agents: For almost all a ∈ A, if (x0
a(v),µ0
a,σ0
a) ∈ Xa for Pa-


















a(v) + q · `(˜ `) > p(v) · ea + p(v) · (˜ µr
a(v)t) for every v ∈ V 0
(E5) Beliefs are correct: For almost every a ∈ A, Pa = P(µ,σ) and f(·;m) =
¯ φ(µ,σ)(·;m) for each m ∈ M such that ζ (m;µ) < 1.
In equilibrium, µ is consistent, which implies that ζ (m;µ) ∈ {0,1} for every membership
m. If ζ (m;µ) = 1, groups with membership m form with probability zero, so beliefs on
membership characteristics f (·;m) are not constrained by the choices (µ,σ) and the random
group formation model R(µ,σ). When ζ (m;µ) = 0, the corresponding group forms with
probability one, in which case f(·;m) must agree with the empirical distribution derived
from the random group formation model.
Nothing in our deﬁnition of equilibrium implies that private-goods prices are the same
at every matching. Nonetheless, if prices are state-independent, then aggregate demand is
constant almost everywhere by the law of large numbers, which provides a tractable way to
prove existence of equilibrium. Modeling the matching process gives us a foundation for a
precise version of an exact law of large numbers, but also illuminates the fact that constant
23prices would be an assumption in our model. This assumption is, in eﬀect, maintained in
Prescott and Townsend (2006) and Zame (2007).
We say that ¯ p ∈ (RN
+)V is a constant price if ¯ p(v) = p for some p ∈ RN
+ and for almost
all v ∈ V . When p is a constant price, agents face idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding
their groups, but no price uncertainty. As a consequence, an agent’s private-goods demand
set depends only on his own augmented list, but not on the entire matching. Because
agents’ augmented lists are independent random variables, their demands are independent.
The idiosyncratic randomness faced by each agent vanishes in aggregate by a law of large
numbers, as we show below.
Given a state space V , in order to describe demand deﬁne, for each a ∈ A, and ˜ ` ∈
Lists( ˜ M),
Va(˜ `) := {v ∈ V : ˜ µr
a(v) = ˜ `}
The aggregate output of groups and the resulting transfers are random, because they



























a(v)t dP (µ,σ)(v) dλ(a)
H(µ,σ) and T(µ,σ) are equal if µ is consistent. Moreover, each expectation is equal to
the corresponding value for almost all v by the law of large numbers. The following lemma
formalizes these results.
Lemma 6.1 Let (V,V,P(µ,σ)) be the probability space associated with the random group
formation model R(µ,σ). Let ¯ p be a constant price and q ∈ RM.
























(b) If µ is consistent, then H(µ,σ) = T(µ,σ).
(c) For each a ∈ A, ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M), and P (µ,σ)-almost all v,v0 ∈ Va(˜ `),
ξa(¯ p,q;Pa,na)(v) = ξa(¯ p,q;Pa,na)(v0).
24(d) For P(µ,σ)-almost all v ∈ V
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Proof Agents’ transfers ˜ µat are pairwise independent as a consequence of Theorem 4.2.
Part (a) follows from the law of large numbers (Corollary 2.10 of Sun (2006)).
Part (b) holds by deﬁnition of t when µ is consistent.
Part (c) follows because with a constant price, v aﬀects agent a’s preferences and budget
set only through his own augmented list ˜ µa.
For (d), we use the fact that agent a’s demand set ξa (¯ p,q;Pa,na)(v) is the same for all
v ∈ Va(˜ `), for each ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M). For each a ∈ A and v ∈ V , let ¯ ξa (¯ p,q;Pa,na)(v) be a
selection from the demand set. By Theorem 4.2, for diﬀerent agents these selections deﬁne
pairwise independent random variables on V . Then by the law of large numbers (Corollary
2.10 of Sun (2006)), for P(µ,σ)-almost every v ∈ V
Z
A








Since the righthand side does not depend on v, the selection generates the same aggregate
demand with probability one. Since every element of aggregate demand in (d) is deﬁned by
some selection, the result follows.
Restricting to constant prices allows us to recast the existence problem in ﬁnite di-
mensions. If prices are constant, then consumptions can be restricted to be elements of
(RN)Lists( ˜ M) instead of (RN
+)V without loss of generality. With this restriction, say the
choices (x,µ,σ) : A → (RN
+)Lists( ˜ M)×Lists(M)×Σ are feasible if the aggregatemembership
vector
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Let Wa (·;f) : ˆ Xa → R represent agent a’s expected utility, deﬁned as
Wa(xa,µa,σa;f) :=
X
˜ `∈Lists( ˜ M)
n(˜ `;µa,σa,f)ua(xa(˜ `), ˜ `)
where
ˆ Xa = {(x,`,ˆ σ) ∈ (RN
+)Lists( ˜ M) × Lists(M)× Σ : (x(˜ `),`,ˆ σ) ∈ Xa for each ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M)
and (`, ˆ σ) ∈ Lists(M)× Σ}
25We use this reformulation in the appendix to show that an equilibrium with beliefs on
membership characteristics exists.13
A basic problem encountered in club models is that group formation can deplete mem-
bers’ resources entirely, so they end up in the zero-wealth situation. We modify assump-
tions used in EGSZ (1999, 2005) to avoid this problem, and to restore the equivalence
between quasi-equilibrium and equilibrium. First, we say that endowments are desirable
if ua (ea,0) > ua(0, ˜ `) for all (˜ `, ˆ σ) ∈ Lists( ˜ M) × Σ such that (0, ˜ `, ˆ σ) ∈ Xa. Next, let E
be a group economy and let (x,µ,σ) be a feasible state. Let I ⊂ {1,...,N} be a non-
empty set of private goods. Say that the feasible state (x,µ,σ) is a minimum consumption
conﬁguration for good i if for almost all agents a ∈ A there does not exist a bundle x0
a
of private goods such that x0
a ≤ xa,x0
ai < xai and (x0
a,µa,σa) ∈ Xa. (If (0,µa,σa) ∈ Xa
then a feasible state is a minimum consumption conﬁguration for good i only if the entire
social endowment of i is used in group formation.) Say that (x,µ,σ) is group linked if for
every partition I ∪ J = {1,...,N} of the set of consumption goods for which (x,µ,σ) is a
minimum expenditure conﬁguration for each good i ∈ I, then for almost every a ∈ A there
is a real number r ∈ R and an index j ∈ J such that
ua(ea + rδj,0) > ua(xa, ˜ µa)
for each ˜ µa ∈ {˜ µa ∈ Lists( ˜ M)|˜ µa(m,s) = 1 ⇒ µa(m) = 1 and σa,m = sm}, where δj is the
jth unit vector. We say that E is group irreducible if every feasible state is group linked.
That is, if the entire social endowment of the private goods in I is used up in production,
then for almost all agents a, there is some good j / ∈ I and some suﬃciently large level of
consumption of good j such that agent a would prefer consuming his endowment together
with this large level of good j, and belong to no groups, rather than consume the bundle
xa in the augmented group memberships ˜ µa.
Theorem 6.1 If endowments are desirable and the economy is group irreducible, then a
group equilibrium with beliefs on membership characteristics exists.
In the proof of this theorem, given in the appendix, we show that the argument of EGSZ
(1999) can be extended to account for the introduction of unveriﬁable characteristics, the
dependence of choices on beliefs over membership characteristics, and to secure correct
beliefs in equilibrium. In fact, the proof actually establishes the stronger result that there
exists a constant-price group equilibrium with beliefs on membership characteristics.
If we restrict to constant prices, then equilibria with beliefs on membership character-
istics coincide with group perfect equilibria, as the following theorem shows.
13To avoid confusions that might arise from the change in commodity space, we deﬁne the restricted notion
of equilibrium formally in the appendix.
26Theorem 6.2 Suppose that endowments are desirable and the economy is group irre-
ducibile.
(i) Every group perfect equilibrium with constant prices is a group equilibrium with beliefs
on membership characteristics.
(ii) Every group equilibrium with beliefs on membership characteristics and constant prices
is a group perfect equilibrium.
Proof For (i), let ε > 0 be given, and let (xε,µε,σε),R(µε,σε),(pε,qε) be a group equi-
librium in Eε. We ﬁrst show that there exist beliefs fε on membership characteristics
such that (xε,µε,σε),R(µε,σε),(pε,qε),fε is an equilibrium with beliefs on membership
characteristics in the economy Eε.
Let fε be deﬁned by
fε (s−m;m) := ¯ φε
(µε,σε) (s−m;m) for each s and m
Then (E5) (correct beliefs) is satisﬁed by deﬁnition.
Since every group type forms in a group equilibrium in the economy Eε, each agent
believes with probability one that his chosen groups will form if he deviates. That is,
almost every realized list is equal to the chosen list. The optimization condition (E4) is
therefore equivalent to the optimization condition (E2). Thus the group equilibrium is also
an equilibrium with beliefs on membership characteristics, with beliefs fε.
By passing to a subsequence if necessary, deﬁne f by




Take (x,µ,σ),(p,q) to be the limit of (xε↓,µε,σε),(pε↓,qε) as ε → 0. We show that
(x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ),(p,q),f is an equilibrium with beliefs on membership characteristics and
constant prices.
For each (y,`,ˆ σ) ∈ (RN
+)Lists( ˜ M) × Lists(M) × Σ and a ∈ A,
lim
ε→0
Wa(y,`,ˆ σ; ¯ φε
(µε,σε)) = Wa (y,`, ˆ σ;f)
Next we show that (E4) holds, that is, that (x,µ,σ) is optimal given (p,q) for almost
all agents. To that end, suppose not. Then by Lusin’s Theorem, there exist δ0 > 0, A0 ⊂ A













> Wa (xa,µa,σa;f) + δ0 (5)
27and
p · x0
a(˜ `) + q · µ0
a ≤ p · ea + p · (˜ `t) if n(˜ `;µ0
a,σ0
a,f) > 0
We show that this is impossible because it must imply that (xε,µε,σε),R(µε,σε),(pε,qε),fε
is not an equilibrium for ε suﬃciently close to 0.
To that end, let ˜ ` : A0 → Lists( ˜ M) be a selection of augmented lists such that for
each a ∈ A0, n(˜ `a;µ0
a,σ0
a,f) > 0 and x0
ai(˜ `a) > 0 for some commodity i. The existence
of these lists follows from the assumption that endowments are desirable. Further, since
(x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ),(p,q) is a group equilibrium, it follows from group irreducibility and de-
sirability of endowments that p ∈ RN
++ (see Proposition 3.3 of EGSZ 1999), so there exists
pmin such that pi ≥ pmin > 0 for each i.




￿Lists( ˜ M) such that





a;f) − Wa (za,µ0
a,σ0
a;f) < δ0/3 for each a ∈ A0
(c) for each a ∈ A0 and some commodity i, x0
ai(˜ `a) > zai(˜ `a) + δ1 > 0
Choose δ2 > 0 such that
(d) δ2 < δ1pmin
Now take a sequence εn → 0. By Egoroﬀ’s Theorem, there exists ¯ n and a set A1 ⊂ A0




















a(˜ `a) + qεn
· µ0
a < pεn
· ea + pεn
· (˜ `at) + δ2







a ; ¯ φεn
(µεn,σεn)) (6)
pεn
· za(˜ `a) + qεn
· µ0
a < pεn
· ea + pεn
· (˜ `at) (7)




· za(˜ `a) + δ1pmin. Adding (d) and (g) yields
pεn








· ea + pεn
· (˜ `at) + δ2 − δ1pmin < pεn
· ea + pεn
· (˜ `at)
28from which (7) follows.











equilibrium with beliefs on memberships for each Eεn
.
For the converse, part (ii), let (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ),(p,q),f be a group equilibrium with
beliefs on membership characteristics and constant prices. We construct an economy Eε for
each ε > 0. Choose a mapping σε : Aε → Σ such that for each g, each m ∈ M(g), and each








That is, for each membership m, choose a distributionof strategiesamong the agents a ∈ Aε
m
such that the induced joint distribution on membership characteristics matches that given
by f.
Choose preferences for each a ∈ ∪mAε
m by setting ua(x, ˜ `) = p · x.
Next, construct the equilibrium consumption bundles and endowments for each added
agent in the economy Eε. Each agent in Aε
m isconstrained to choose the list µa that includes a
single membership, m, and the strategy given above. Correspondingly, agent a’s augmented
lists ˜ µa are constrained to Lists( ˜ M)(µa) := {˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M) : ˜ `(m,s) = 1 ⇒ µa(m) =
1}. Choose endowments eε
a so that for almost every a ∈ Aε
m, eε
a + t˜ µa ￿ 0 for all ˜ µa ∈
Lists( ˜ M)(µa). Then for each a ∈ ∪mAε
m, set xε
a(v) = eε
a + t˜ µr
a(v) for each v.
For each a ∈ A, set (µε
a,σε
a) = (µa,σa), and set xε
a so that xε
a(vε) = xa(v) for every
vε ∈ V ε(˜ µ) and every v ∈ V (˜ µ), each ˜ µ ∈ U. Similarly, set qε = q and pε so that
pε(vε) = p(v) for every every vε ∈ V ε(˜ µ) and every v ∈ V (˜ µ), each ˜ µ ∈ U. By construction,
pε and each xε
a are expansion invariant, with pε↓ = p and x
ε↓
a = xa for each a ∈ A.












For the original economy, to show that (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ),(p,q) is a group perfect equi-
librium, it remains to show that it is a group equilibrium. But this follows because
(x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ),(p,q),f is an equilibrium with beliefs on membership characteristics. Any
utility improvement available to an agent who knows correctly the group formation model
is also available if the agent also thinks his groups will form with probability one. This
implies that almost all agents are optimizing under both equilibrium concepts.
29This equivalence result, coupled with the existence of equilibrium with beliefs on mem-
bership characteristics and constant prices, establishes the existence of group perfect equi-
libria as well.
Theorem 6.3 If endowments are desirable and the economy is group irreducible, then a
group perfect equilibrium exists.
Proof This follows from Theorem 6.1 and 6.2.
For group types that do not form in equilibrium, there is no empirical basis for the
beliefs on membership characteristics. The next example illustrates the importance of
beliefs regarding group types that do not form in equilibrium. Example 5 shows that beliefs
can support an ineﬃcient state with no group formation at all, even if agents believe that
their chosen groups will be ﬁlled.
As example 4 showed, variation in prices can be a source of ineﬃciency. Restricting
to constant prices evidently eliminates this source of ineﬃciency, but nevertheless does not
ensure eﬃcient outcomes. This is not surprising, since the basic ineﬃciencies of game theory,
such as coordination problems, remain. More strikingly, though, example 6 demonstrates
that equilibria with constant prices can be Pareto ranked, even when the choices (µ,σ) are
ﬁxed and the equilibria entail the same distribution on matchings and beliefs.
Example 5: Ineﬃcient equilibrium with no groups
Suppose there is a single group type g with two memberships m1,m2 ∈ M(g). As in
our previous examples, suppose agents can take one of two unveriﬁable characteristics in
each membership, so Sm1 = Sm2 = {b,c}. Each agent can choose at most one membership.
There is a single private good, of which every agent is endowed with e = 3 units. Agents
a ∈ [0,2/3) are constrained to choose strategy b in each membership, and have utility
function




x if ˜ `(m,bb) = 1 for m ∈ M(g)
x − 1 if ˜ `(m1,bc) = 1 or ˜ `(m2,cb) = 1
x if ˜ ` = 0
Agents a ∈ [2/3,1]are constrained to choose c in each membership, and have utility function




x − 4 if ˜ `(m,cc) = 1 for m ∈ M(g)
x + 1/2 if ˜ `(m1,cb) = 1 or ˜ `(m2,bc) = 1
x − 1 if ˜ ` = 0
One equilibrium with beliefs on membership characteristics in this example has half of the
b agents taking m1 memberships, and all of the c agents taking m2 memberships. The
remaining b agents take no memberships. These choices are supported by membership
prices q(m1) = −1 and q (m2) = 1, and (correct) beliefs f(c;m1) = 1, f(b;m2) = 1.
30This is not the only equilibrium with beliefs on membership characteristics, however.
Suppose instead that all agents believe that the distribution of characteristicsin their groups
will match the population distribution. That is, suppose agents hold beliefs f(c;m) =
1/3, f(b;m) = 2/3 for each m ∈ M(g). Since the memberships are indistinguishable,
membership prices are zero, and it is optimal to take no memberships. No groups form in
this equilibrium, which is ineﬃcient. ♦
Example 6: Constant-price equilibria may be Pareto ranked
As in example 4, start with an ordinary two-person exchange economy with strictly con-
cave utility functions v1,v2 : RN
+ → R+, and endowments e1 = e2 ∈ RN
+. We suppose that
































We embed this exchange economy in a group formation model by imagining that each
agent’s ex-post utility for private goods depends on the augmented group type into which
he is randomly matched, and may be either v1 or v2. There is a single group type g with two
memberships M(g) = {m1,m2}, and two unveriﬁable characteristics, Sm1 = Sm2 = {b,c}.
Each agent can choose one membership. Agents a ∈ [0,1/2) are constrained to choose
strategy b in each membership, and agents a ∈ [1/2,1] must choose strategy c.
The utility function for each agent a ∈ A is:




v1 (x) if ˜ `(m,bc) = 1 for m ∈ M(g)
v2 (x) if ˜ `(m,bb) = 1 or ˜ `(m,cc) = 1 for m ∈ M(g)
1
2 min(v1(x) − 1,v2(x) − 1) if ˜ ` = 0
There is a constant price equilibrium with private goods prices p‡ and membership prices
q = 0 in which half the agents of each type take each membership. Half of the agents
will be matched with like agents, and half will be in a mixed group. The agents in mixed
groups (g,bc) or (g,cb) consume x
‡
1 while the agents in homogeneous groups (g,bb) or (g,cc)
consume x
‡











By the same argument, there is a second constant price equilibrium with private goods
prices p† and membership prices q = 0 in which the agents in mixed groups (g,bc) or
(g,cb) consume x
†
1 and the agents in homogeneous groups (g,bb) or (g,cc) consume x
†
2. By






















7 Eﬃciency: Private goods and Insurance
The trading of private goods must be eﬃcient from an ex post point of view, after the state
v has been realized. Because the consumption of private goods depends on the state and
is therefore random, this does not imply that trades are eﬃcient from an ex ante point of
view, even keeping the memberships and strategies (µ,σ) ﬁxed. Example 4 illustrates that
a Pareto improvement can be achieved by averaging over the consumptions supported ex
post by diﬀerent prices. Example 6 illustrates that constant-price equilibria can sometimes
be Pareto ranked. An agent might be willing to trade lower utility at some states for higher
utility at another state, both predicated on the same memberships and strategies (µ,σ).
In this section, we investigate whether insurance can allow eﬃcient trades across states,
and the eﬀect this has on resulting equilibrium prices. The insurance we describe is feasible
provided augmented membership lists are are not only observable ex post, but also veriﬁable
ex post.
We begin with an example to illustrate the ideas.
Example 7: Eﬃcient trading with insurance
There is a single private good, all agents have the same endowment, e = 0, and the
ex-post utility function of every agent a ∈ A is given by ua(x, ˜ `) =
√
x. There is a single
group type g with two memberships, M(g) = {m1,m2}, that either agent can take. Since
nothing veriﬁable distinguishes memberships, q = 0 in any equilibrium.
The unveriﬁable characteristics in the two memberships are Sm1 = Sm2 = {b,c}. Agents
a ∈ [0,1/2) are constrained to play strategy b in every membership and agents a ∈ [1/2,1]
are constrained to play strategy c. The output in each augmented group is
h(g,bc) = h(g,cb) = 4
h(g,cc) = h(g,bb) = 0
The internal transfers t give the same payment to each member, which is half the output y.
Consider the equilibrium of the economy in which half the agents of each type choose
each membership. If an agent is matched in an augmented group (g,bb) or (g,cc), he
consumes 0. If matched in an augmented group (g,bc) or (g,cb) he consumes 2. Thus,




1/2. Expected utility can be
improved if the lucky agents in augmented groups (g,bc) or (g,cb) transfer consumption to
the unlucky agents in augmented groups (g,bb) and (g,cc), so that all agents consume 1
regardless of the matching. The riskiness in consumption can be eliminated by insurance.
♦
32We model insurance by modifying the agents’ budget constraints. Each agent faces a
single budget constraint that holds in expectation, rather than a separate budget constraint
at each state. Implicitly, this allows the agent to transfer income between states.
Deﬁnition 8 A group equilibrium with insurance consists of a feasible state (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ),
private goods prices p ∈ (RN
+)V with p 6= 0, where p is measurable, membership prices
q ∈ RM, and beliefs {Pa,na,a ∈ A} such that (E1), (E3), and (E6) hold, where
(E6) Optimization by agents: For almost all a ∈ A, if (x0
a(v),µ0
a,σ0
a) ∈ Xa for Pa-



























This model of insurance is similar to that of Malinvaud (1973), in which agents are
understood to be insured at actuarially fair prices when their consumption choices maximize
utility subject to an expected budget constraint. A natural question is how to implement
such insurance, and in particular, whether such insurance can be achieved by trading Arrow
securities or other assets. Cass, Chichilnisky and Wu (1996) consider this question in a
model like Malinvaud’s, with a ﬁnite number of types of consumers, and with ﬁnitely many
collective states arising from the independent risks faced by the individuals. They show
that insurance in the Malinvaud sense can be achieved if agents trade H(S −1)T insurance
contracts against individual risks, together with T Arrow securities against collective risks,
where H is the number of consumer types, S is the number of individual states and T is
the number of collective states.
In our model, due to the continuum and to the law of large numbers, there is no col-
lective risk on supply of commodities, although there is collective risk on prices. A natural
interpretation of Arrow securities would be that claims depend on states v, and the claims
trade at actuarially fair prices relative to the probability distribution P(µ,σ). No further
insurance instruments would be necessary, as the probability distribution describes the so-
cial risks and, through the induced probability distribution on ˜ µ, the individual risks. A
conjecture in the spirit of Cass, Chichilnisky and Wu (1996) would be that it is enough
to trade Arrow securities with claims linked to a reduced set of states indexed by private-
goods prices, and in addition, agents insure individually against variation in their individual
augmented lists.14
14We note that the insurance we have modeled cannot be implemented by an insurance ﬁrm that involves
a ﬁnite collection of agents, so we cannot replicate these results by introducing insurance group types.
33Introducing insurance in this sense yields an eﬃcient allocation of private goods, con-
ditional on the memberships and strategies, (µ,σ). A state (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ) is Pareto












ua (xa(v), ˜ µr
a(v)) dP(µ,σ)(v)
for almost every a ∈ A, with strict inequality for a set of agents A0 ⊂ A with positive
measure. A feasible state (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ) is Pareto optimal if it is not Pareto dominated.
Theorem 7.1 Suppose (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ),(p,q),{Pa,na,a ∈ A} is a group equilibrium with
insurance. Then no feasible state (x0,µ,σ),R(µ,σ) Pareto dominates (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ).
Proof Let (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ),(p,q),{Pa,na,a ∈ A} be an equilibrium with insurance, and
suppose that (x0,µ,σ),R(µ,σ) is a feasible state that Pareto dominates (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ).












ua (xa(v), ˜ µr
a(v)) dP(µ,σ)(v)












ua (xa(v), ˜ µr
a(v)) dP(µ,σ)(v)
for almost all a ∈ A \ A0. For a ∈ A0,






a(v) − ˜ µr
a(v)t− ea
￿
dP (µ,σ)(v) > 0
while for a ∈ A \ A0, strict monotonicity implies






a(v) − ˜ µr
a(v)t− ea
￿
dP (µ,σ)(v) ≥ 0












a(v) − ˜ µr
a(v)t− ea
￿
dP (µ,σ)(v)dλ(a) > 0
Since µ is consistent, q ·
R








a(v) − ˜ µr
a(v)t − ea
￿
dP (µ,σ)(v)dλ(a) > 0 (8)














− ea]dλ(a) ≤ 0 (9)
































a(v) − ˜ µr
a(v)t− ea
￿
dλ(a) ≤ 0 for P(µ,σ)-almost all v ∈ V
This violates feasibility of x0.
Theorem 7.1 is a constrained version of the ﬁrst welfare theorem, since the comparison
is only among feasible states that share the same membership and strategy choices (µ,σ).
In example 7, the equilibrium with insurance is eﬃcient conditional on membership choices,
but there is a Pareto-superior equilibrium with complete sorting in which agents of type
b choose m1 and agents of type c choose m2. The Pareto superior equilibrium is possible
despite Theorem 7.1 because the two equilibria involve diﬀerent membership choices.
On the other hand, suppose that (µ,σ) is “eﬃcient” in the sense that (x,µ,σ) is an
eﬃcient state for some x. An implication of examples 4 and 6 is that, absent insurance, an
equilibrium state (x0,µ,σ) might not be eﬃcient.
The insurance scheme described in (E6) implicitly allows the agent to insure against
both sources of randomness, the randomness due to variation in prices and the randomness
in matching. However, the next theorem shows that, with insurance, one of these sources of
randomness disappears. Equilibrium prices are constant, provided utility for private goods
consumption is suitably concave and diﬀerentiable. If utility is concave, insurance leads to
constant consumption of private goods. Insurance also leads to constant prices, provided
there is a unique price vector that supports the given consumption of private goods.
Theorem 7.2 Suppose that (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ),(p,q) is a group equilibrium with insurance
in which p is strictly positive and xa is strictly positive for almost all a ∈ A. Suppose for
almost all a ∈ A, ua(·, ˜ `) is C2, strictly concave, and Dxua(x, ˜ `) ￿ 0 for each x ∈ RN
++ and
˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M). Then the private-goods prices p are constant and the consumption x satisﬁes
xa(v) = xa(v0) for a.e. a ∈ A, a.e. v,v0 ∈ Va(˜ `), for each ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M) (10)
Proof We ﬁrst show (10). We show that if x does not satisfy (10), then there is a feasible
state (x0,µ,σ),R(µ,σ) that Pareto dominates the equilibrium state (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ), in
contradiction to Theorem 7.1.
35For each a ∈ A and ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M), let ¯ xa(˜ `) be the expected consumption of a at ˜ `:





Va(˜ `) xa(v)dP(µ,σ)(v) if P(µ,σ)(Va(˜ `)) > 0
0 if P(µ,σ)(Va(˜ `)) = 0
Let x0
a(v) = ¯ xa(˜ `) for each a ∈ A, v ∈ Va(˜ `), and ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M). Using strict concavity of the
utility functions, the state (x0,µ,σ) is preferred to the state (x,µ,σ) by every agent. Since x
does not satisfy (10) and x0 does satisfy (10), there is a set of agents A0 of positive measure
for whom x0
a(v) 6= xa(v) on a set of positive measure. For these agents, the preference is
strict. Further, the constructed state (x0,µ,σ)is feasible by the law of large numbers. This
contradicts Theorem 7.1, thus (10) holds.
To see why p must be constant, we use the fact that agents’ augmented lists are inde-
pendent, from Theorem 4.2. Choose A0 ⊂ A, with λ(A \ A0) = 0, such that for each pair
a,b ∈ A0, ˜ µr
a and ˜ µr
b are independent. Using (10) and the additional assumptions on prefer-
ences, A0 can also be chosen so that for each a ∈ A0 and ˜ `a such that P(µ,σ)(Va(˜ `a)) > 0,
p is constant on Va(˜ `a). Then if p is not constant on V , there exist sets V 0,V 00 ⊂ V of
P(µ,σ)−positive measure such that
(i) p(v0) 6= p(v00) for all v0 ∈ V 0,v00 ∈ V 00
Further, there are agents a,b ∈ A0 and augmented lists ˜ `a, ˜ `b such that
(ii) P(µ,σ)(Va(˜ `a) ∩ V 0) > 0, P(µ,σ)(Vb(˜ `b) ∩ V 00) > 0
¿From (i) and (ii), and because p is constant on each of Va(˜ `a) and Vb(˜ `b), we conclude
that
P(µ,σ)(Va(˜ `a) ∩ Vb(˜ `b)) = 0
In particular,
P(µ,σ)(Va(˜ `a)|˜ µr
b = ˜ `b) = 0 6= P(µ,σ)(Va(˜ `a))
which contradicts the independence of ˜ µr
a and ˜ µr
b.
8 Eﬃciency and Residual Claimants
So far we have illustrated two broad classes of ineﬃciency that can arise in our model, belief-
driven coordination problems, and missing insurance markets. These do not exhaust the
ineﬃciencies that may arise, however, such as those due to screening or moral hazard. An
important question is which ineﬃciencies are irremediable, and which can be remedied with
a suﬃciently rich set of group types, in particular, with groups incorporating appropriately
designed mechanisms. Since agents are allowed to choose the groups they join, we might
36expect them to choose groups with mechanisms that support eﬃcient outcomes. That is
the point of this section.
We show that when characteristics or actions are observable to all group members (but
not veriﬁable), eﬃciency can be achieved if group types incorporate reporting mechanisms
and residual claimants in the spirit of Maskin (1999). Roughly, by incorporating appropri-
ately designed mechanisms, some equilibrium states replicate those in a model in which all
characteristics and strategies are veriﬁable. In these equilibria, the randomness that comes
from the unveriﬁability of agents’ actions or characteristics is eliminated. If the elimination
of randomness leads to eﬃciency, the resulting equilibria are eﬃcient. These equilibria are
akin to the eﬃcient equilibria described by EGSZ (1999, 2005). However, the qualiﬁca-
tion has bite. As we discuss below, eﬃciency can sometimes be improved by introducing
randomness, although not necessarily the randomness that arises naturally through the
unveriﬁability of strategies.
We begin the section with three examples that illustrate the role of residual claimaints.
Residual claimants can enable screening, can solve moral hazard problems, and can allow
agents to choose eﬃcient group types. In the remainder of the section, we show how these
ideas can be extended and generalized.
8.1 Three Examples
Example 8 shows that a veriﬁable signal of unveriﬁable characteristics can be used to screen
members. A residual claimant administerspunishments by collecting the proﬁt when screen-
ing fails. Example 9 illustrates how a residual claimant can prevent the moral hazard in
teams that arises from budget balance (Holmstrom 1984). Example 10 shows how direct
revelation mechanisms can be embedded in general equilibrium, and illustrates how a resid-
ual claimant can be used to elicit correlated information that no one observes until the
group has formed.
Example 8: Veriﬁable Signals of Unveriﬁable Characteristics
In this example, the group’s output of the private good is a veriﬁable signal of the
unveriﬁable characteristics. In this case screening may be possible by punishing workers if
they do not produce the intended output. The punishment is to give all the output to a
residual claimant, called a supervisor.
There are three group types G = {gbb,gbc,gcc}. The labels on the group types are
intended to be used as a coordinating device. There are three memberships in each group
type, denoted M(g) = {sp,w1,w2} for each g ∈ G. For each g ∈ G, the supervisor sp has
a single null characteristic Ssp(g) = {sp}, while workers can be of two types Sw(g) = {b,c}
for w = w1,w2. There are two private goods. The production technology in each group
type is the same, but output varies with the unveriﬁable characteristics of members. In
37particular, for each g ∈ G,
h(g,(sp,b,b)) = (6,0)
h(g,(sp,b,c)) = h(g,(sp,c,b)) = (5,0)
h(g,(sp,c,c)) = (0,2)
The set of agents is A = [0,2]. Each a ∈ [0,1] is constrained to be a worker, and each
a ∈ (1,2] is constrained to be a supervisor. Each agent can join only one group. Workers
a ∈ [0,ρ) are constrained to choose the action b in each membership, and workers a ∈ [ρ,1]
are constrained to choose the action c in each membership. Each agent has the ex-post
utility function given by ua(x, ˜ `) = x1 + x2.
The transfer payments that enable screening are the following, for i = 1,2.
tbb(wi,y) =
￿
(3,0) if y = (6,0)
(0,0) if y 6= (6,0)
and tbb(sp,y) =
￿
(0,0) if y = (6,0)
(6,0) if y 6= (6,0)
tcc(wi,y) =
￿
(0,1) if y = (0,2)
(0,0) if y 6= (0,2)
and tcc(sp,y) =
￿
(0,0) if y = (0,2)
(0,2) if y 6= (0,2)
tbc(w1,y) =
￿
(3,0) if y = (5,0)
(0,0) if y 6= (5,0)
tbc(w2,y) =
￿
(2,0) if y = (5,0)




(0,0) if y = (5,0)
(5,0) if y 6= (5,0)
If ρ < 1/2, the transfers t support an equilibrium in which private goods prices are
p = (1,1), all workers a ∈ [0,ρ) choose memberships w1 ∈ M(gbc), while a proportion ρ of
workers a ∈ [ρ,1] choose memberships w2 ∈ M(gbc), with the remaining measure 1 − 2ρ of
agents in [ρ,1] divided equally between memberships w1 and w2 in M(gcc). The membership
prices for all groups are zero. The common beliefs that support this equilibrium satisfy
f(c;w1) = 1 for w1 ∈ M(gbc)
f(b;w2) = 1 for w2 ∈ M(gbc)
f(b;w1) = f(b;w2) = 1 for w1,w2 ∈ M(gbb)
f(c;w1) = f(c;w2) = 1 for w1,w2 ∈ M(gcc)
♦
Example 9: Moral hazard and budget balance
As discussed by Holmstrom (1984), team production will be ineﬃcient because of budget
balance. Since the team members share the output, not every team member can be rewarded
38with his marginal product, and eﬀort will be suboptimal. Prescott and Townsend (2006)
assumed that this problem can be solved by merely having a supervisor present. We show
instead that the problem can be solved by designating the supervisor as a residual claimant.
Provided there is no cost to engaging a residual claimant, ﬁrms with residual claimants will
drive out teams with no residual claimants.
More speciﬁcally, let G = {gt,gf}, with M(gf) = {sp,w1,w2} and M(gt) = {w1,w2}.
The team gt and the ﬁrm gf have the same production technology, each with two workers.
In addition, the ﬁrm has a supervisor, who acts as a residual claimant.
In each group, workers can take low eﬀort or high eﬀort, and the supervisor has a null
strategy, sp. That is, Sw (g) = {e`,eh} for w = w1,w2 and Ssp (g) = {sp} for g ∈ G.






y` if (sw1,sw2)= (e`,e`)
ym if (sw1,sw2) = (eh,e`) or (e`,eh)
yh if (sw1,sw2) = (eh,eh)
for g ∈ G, where y` < ym < yh.
The transfers in a team divide the output between the workers. The transfers in the
supervised ﬁrm divide the output between the workers if the output is high (which means
the workers took high eﬀort), but otherwise give the output to the supervisor.
tgt(w1,y) = tgt(w2,y) =
1
2
y for y ∈ R
tgf(w1,y) = tgf(w2,y) =
￿ 1
2y if y = yh
0 if y 6= yh
tgf(sp,y) =
￿
0 if y = yh
y if y 6= yh
We suppose that each agent can take a singlemembership. Agents a ∈ [0,ρ)are equipped
to be workers, while agents a ∈ [ρ,1] are equipped to be supervisors. More agents are
equipped to be supervisors than workers, that is, ρ < 1/2.
Preferences are as follows. The supervisor cares only about income. Each worker’s
utility can be written x+v(e`), where x ∈ R+, and in particular, the outputs and disutility
of eﬀort are such that
(1/2)yh + v(eh) = 6 (1/2)y` + v(e`) = 3
(1/2)ym + v(e`) = 7 (1/2)ym + v(eh) = 2
First consider the strategies chosen by the workers. The games played by workers in the







Low eﬀort levels (e`,e`) are the equilibrium strategies in the team and high eﬀort levels
(eh,eh) are the equilibrium strategies in the supervised ﬁrm, as is eﬃcient.
Since supervisors are in excess supply, they will get zero payoﬀ in equilibrium. Thus,
the equilibrium membership prices are
qgt (w1) = qgt (w2) = 0
qgf (w1) = qgf (w2) = qgf (sp) = 0
Workers who choose teams get utility 3 through the internal transfers, and workers who
choose supervised ﬁrms get utility 6. Clearly, workers will choose supervised ﬁrms instead
of teams, since supervised ﬁrms support the eﬃcient level of eﬀort, and all the proceeds go
to the workers. ♦
Example 10: Direct Revelation and Bayesian Mechanisms
This example illustrateshow a group type can accommodateimplementationby Bayesian
equilibrium in a direct-revelation game. The mechanism reveals information that is not ob-
servable to anyone before the group has formed, namely a patient’s medical condition.
Screening is not possible because the patient does not know the diagnosis, and the physi-
cians only observe it after seeing the patient. The direct revelation game will reveal the
patient’s condition by using the patient as a residual claimant.15
There are three types of medical clinics G = (go,gr,gm), each with two doctors and
a patient with an injured knee, thus M(g) = {p,d1,d2}. After the clinic has formed, the
doctors receive private, correlated signals regarding the correct treatment, and private,
uncorrelated information about their own costs of treating the patient.
The medical clinicgo is aggressivein the sense that it alwaystreatsthe knee by operating,
while the clinic gr is conservative in the sense that it always treats the knee with RICE
(rest, ice, compression and elevation). The third clinic gm implements a mechanism-design
approach to discover which is the better treatment. In the clinic gm, two problems must be
solved: to discover the correct treatment, and, if an operation is required, to discover the
lower-cost doctor. The patient has no signal of which treatment is correct, and will not be
able to distinguish ex-post whether he got the right treatment.
The clinic plays a direct-revelation game to reveal the best treatment, and, if necessary,
to ﬁnd the lower-cost physician. The patient acts as a residual claimant in the resulting
information-revelation game, and can thus avoid the impasse that would arise from budget
15Alternatively, a shareholder could be the residual claimant.
40balance if the doctors could only make payments between themselves. In the absence of a
residual claimant, there might not be a mechanism that elicits their true information about
the patient’s condition, as we will see.
After examining the patient, each doctor has a true diagnosis about the best treatment,
θ1,θ2 ∈ {r,o} (RICE or operate). The mechanism in the clinic will implement the best
treatment as a function of the doctors’ diagnoses, τ (θ1,θ2), which is assumed to satisfy:
τ(o,o) = o
τ(o,r) = τ(r,o) = τ(r,r) = r
The doctors’ costs of operating are c1,c2 ∈ {c`,ch}.
We assume that for each doctor, the prior probability of each diagnosis is π(r) = π(o) =
1/2, and that the doctors agree with probability 2/3. That is, the conditional probabilities
satisfy
π (r|r) = π(o|o) = 2/3
π (r|o) = π(o|r) = 1/3
We deﬁne the mechanism of the clinic γ = (γ1,γ2) in two stages. The ﬁrst stage is
given by γ1 = (t,τ), where t deﬁnes transfers in a direct-revelation game in which the
doctors report their diagnoses, and τ is the eﬃcient treatment. In γ1, the transfers t, which
are payments from the patient to the doctors, are symmetric and independent of the cost
reported in the second stage. Let ˆ θ1, ˆ θ2 ∈ {r,o} be the reported diagnoses of the two doctors
in the ﬁrst stage. The transfers to the doctors are denoted t(ˆ θ1, ˆ θ2,d1), t(ˆ θ1, ˆ θ2,d2).
If ˆ θ1 = ˆ θ2 = o, the patient will receive an operation, and the second stage of the
mechanism is reached. This stage, γ2, is a mechanism to choose the lower-cost doctor. To
shorten the discussion, we will not specify the mechanism γ2, but summarize the relevant
aspects in the information rents r(c`) or r(ch), with r(c`) > r(ch). Because there are
information rents in the second stage of the mechanism, the doctors have an incentive to
reach that stage, and would not report their diagnoses truthfully if merely asked. The
corresponding incentive compatability constraints for doctor d1 in the ﬁrst mechanism γ1































There may be no balanced-budget revelation game between the doctors that elicits
the true diagnosis when the true diagnosis is r. By symmetry, budget balance would im-
ply t(o,o,di) = t(r,r,di) = 0 for di = d1,d2, and −t(o,r,d1) = t(o,r,d2) = t(r,o,d1) =
41−t(r,o,d2), hence, (11) would imply
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If r(c2) > 2r(c1) (as may occur when c2 = c`,c1 = ch), these two inequalities are incon-
sistent, so there is no balanced-budget incentive-compatible mechanism. However, with-
out budget balance, there are many mechanisms that support truth-telling, for example,
t(o,o,d1) = t(r,r,d1) = 0, t(o,r,d1) = −2
3r(c`), t(r,o,d1) = −1
3r(c`), analogously for doctor
2.16
If the doctors only care about expected income, the membership prices for doctors (their
wages) must be the same in expectation in the three types of clinics, provided that all three
are used in equilibrium. Of course there will be variance in income in the gm clinic, due
to uncertainty regarding the doctors’ diagnoses. If the patient is risk neutral with respect
to income, and weakly prefers the better treatment, he will always use the clinic gm. If he
wants to avoid variation in income, and if he is reasonably certain what the correct diagnosis
will be, he will use either go or gr, depending on which treatment he believes is correct. ♦
8.2 Residual Claimant Economies
Examples 8, 9 and 10 illustrate ways in which residual claimants can increase eﬃciency by
providing an enforcement mechanism. We now elaborate on this idea by deﬁning a class of
economies in which every group type includes a residual claimant. We show that, provided
eﬃciency can be achieved in a deterministic state of the economy, as deﬁned below, the
introduction of residual claimants can result in an eﬃcient equilibrium.
In the mechanism described below, we eliminate randomness in strategies by labeling
each group type with target strategies, and punishing members for not playing the target
strategies. This is done with the help of a residual claimant.17 If the strategies are veriﬁable
ex post (as well as observable), then the punishments can be created directly by giving all
the output to the residual claimant when the target strategies are not played. That is
the spirit of the mechanism described below, but we address the more diﬃcult case that
strategies are never veriﬁable. This is why we require reporting mechanisms.
As in our basic model, there are N ≥ 1 divisible, publicly traded private goods, and
we begin with a ﬁnite, exogenous set of primitive group types, G. As above, associated to
16A complication in gm is that truth-telling is not the only equilibrium of the game. There may also
be equilibrium strategies in which each doctor lies; this outcome is ineﬃcient, since it leads to the wrong
treatment, but cannot be ruled out in our framework for the same reasons it cannot be ruled out in standard
mechanism design.
17This cannot be accomplished directly, for example, by appealing to a court or other enforcer to punish
a member who deviates from the target, or by requiring a certain strategy as a condition of a membership,
because by assumption no enforcer can observe the strategy.
42group type g is a ﬁnite set of primitive memberships M(g). For each primitive membership
m ∈ M(g), let Sm(g) be the set of unveriﬁable characteristics that might be chosen by the
member m. Let S(g) :=
Q
m∈M(g) Sm(g) denote the characteristics proﬁles for g.
Let Gc = {gs : g ∈ G,s ∈ S(g)} be the set of group types. That is, we create a copy of
the primitive group type g for each s ∈ S(g) and label it gs. Each such group type will have
the same set of memberships as the underlying primitive group type g, with an additional
distinguished member cgs who will be the residual claimant. As we formalize below, the
index s represents the target characteristics of the mechanism to be played in the group
type gs.
Formalizing, for each group type gs ∈ Gc the set of memberships is
Mc(gs) = {ms : m ∈ M(g)}∪ cgs
Let Mc = ∪gs∈GcMc(gs).
To each membership ms ∈ Mc is associated a set of strategies for that membership. The
strategy set is the product of, ﬁrst, the set of unveriﬁable characteristics Sm(g) associated
with the primitive membership m, and, second, a set of reporting strategies Rg := {r :
S(g) → S(g)}. The strategy set associated to each membership cgs is a singleton null
strategy {(sgs,rgs)}. We let rgs ∈ Rg, so all members have the same set of reporting
strategies.






Σ(gs) := {(sms,rms) ∈ Sm(g) × Rg : ms ∈ Mc(gs)}
An element θ ∈ Σ(gs) represents the strategy proﬁle chosen by a group of type gs, that
is, the strategies of the diﬀerent members. The strategy θ has two parts, the characteristics
chosen by the members of the group, and the reporting strategies chosen by members of
the group. Each reporting strategy r ∈ Rg is a function that operates on the chosen
characteristics s ∈ S (g). The strategies generate reports, rθ ∈ S (g)
Mc(gs)\cgs. We use the
notation (sθ,rθ) ∈ S (g) × S (g)
Mc(gs)\cgs to represent the characteristics chosen by, and
the reports delivered by, members of the group other than the residual claimant when the
members choose θ ∈ Σ(gs).
We will focus on equilibria in which agents’ strategies are honest in two ways: the
unveriﬁable characteristics chosen by the members are the target characteristics, and the
members make honest reports to the residual claimants. For each group type gs, the honest
reporting strategy r ∈ Rg satisﬁes r(s) = s for each s ∈ S (g). An agent’s strategy σ ∈ Σ is
43honest if for each gs ∈ Gc and ms ∈ Mc(gs), σms = (sm,r) where (sm,s−m) = s, and r is
the honest reporting strategy.
For each gs ∈ Gc and θ ∈ Σ(gs), (gs,θ) is an augmented group type. Again abusing
notation a bit, let ˜ Mc(gs) be the set of memberships in the augmented group types derived
from gs, namely,
˜ Mc(gs) = {(ms,θ) ∈ Mc (gs) × Σ(gs)}
Group types are also deﬁned by input-output vectors h(gs,sθ), as before, and by transfer
functions tgs : Mc(gs) × RN → RN that divide up the input-output vectors. We assume,
as is natural, that for each g ∈ G and s,s0 ∈ S (g), h(gs,sθ) = h(gs0,sθ0) if sθ = sθ0. That
is, the input-output vector depends only on the characteristics that are actually chosen, not
on the label.
To each residual claimant group type gs is also associated a reporting transfer function
tW
gs : Mc (gs) × S (g)
Mc(gs)\cgs → RN. The transfer function is parameterized by a penalty









0 if r = s × s × ···× s P
ms∈Mc(gs)\cgs W1 otherwise
As we show below, there is an equilibrium in which all members report strategies truth-
fully, provided the penalty W is suﬃciently large.
Agent a’s consumption set Xa ⊂ RN
+ ×Lists(Mc)×Σ speciﬁes the triples (xa,µa,σa) of
private goods, lists of memberships, and strategies that the agent may choose. We assume
that each agent a ∈ A has an endowment (ea,0,(sa,ra)) ∈ Xa. As above, we assume agents’
endowments of private goods are state-independent.
A residual-claimant economy is an economy in which the set of group types, member-
ships, and strategies are as deﬁned above, and in which the mapping a 7→ (Xa,ea,ua)
satisﬁes:
• the consumption set mapping a 7→ Xa is a measurable correspondence such that
for each a ∈ A, if (xa,µa,σa) ∈ Xa, then (xa,µa,σ0
a) ∈ Xa if σa and σ0
a entail the
same choices of unveriﬁable characteristics in all memberships, but diﬀerent reporting
strategies









44The ﬁrst condition says that agents can choose any possible reports. The second condi-
tion stipulates that if there is a mismatch between target characteristics and chosen char-
acteristics, it is only the chosen characteristics that determine utility.
Let Σ−ms(gs) denote the set of strategies of the members in Mc(gs) except ms and the







Then beliefs on membership characteristics are an element f ∈ F. The value f(θ−ms;ms) is
the probability that members of a group of type gs other than ms choose θ−ms ∈ Σ−ms(gs).
We say that beliefs are on honest strategies if f(θ−ms;ms) = 1 for each ms when each
element of θ is honest.
The transfer received by an agent consuming the augmented list ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ Mc) is







gs(ms,rθ) + tgs (ms,h(gs,sθ))
￿
8.3 Eﬃciency in the Residual Claimant Economy
We have constructed the residual claimant economy to ensure that there is an equilibrium
in which agents report honestly on the characteristics chosen within their groups, and
that the characteristics chosen in equilibrium match the target characteristics of the group
label. Such an equilibrium eliminates the randomness that can otherwise result from the
unveriﬁability of characteristics, and the ineﬃciency that results from this randomness.
Say that a feasible state (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ) is deterministic if for almost every a ∈ A, xa
is a constant bundle, that is, xa (v) has the same value for almost all v, and
µa(ms) = 1 ⇒ σa,ms = (sm,r) for some r ∈ Rg
For a deterministic feasible state, we will use xa interchangeably to mean xa ∈ (RN
+)V and
xa ∈ RN
+. In a deterministic state, agents in a group gs choose the characteristics that
match the characteristics proﬁle s.18
Our objective is to ﬁnd conditions under which an eﬃcient equilibrium exists. We do
this by ﬁrst ﬁnding an equilibrium that is deterministic. Then say that nonrandomness
is eﬃcient if every deterministic feasible state that is not Pareto dominated by another
deterministic feasible state is also Pareto optimal in the residual claimant economy.
18We could deﬁne the deterministic state more generally, such that the agents choose a diﬀerent charac-
teristics proﬁle, say ˆ s(gs), but that would be cumbersome without adding anything. Due to our assumption
that members of a group care only about the characteristics proﬁle, and not about the label of the group,
the relabeling would have no eﬀect on utility.
45An equilibrium with honest strategies will be deterministic. To ensure that there is
an equilibrium with honest strategies, the punishment W1 ∈ RN
+ in the reporting transfer
functions must be large enough that paying it would either be infeasible with an agent’s
budget or make the agent worse oﬀ than playing the honest strategy. To this end, say that
tW induces honesty if ∀a ∈ A, ∀x ∈ RN
+, ∀˜ `, ˜ `0,
ua(x + W1, ˜ `) > ua(x, ˜ `0) (12)
In order that there exists W > 0 such that tW induces honesty, it is enough that each agent
has a bounded willingness to pay for his most preferred augmented list, as compared to
his least preferred augmented list. To this end, say that willingness to pay for strategies is
bounded if ∃W > 0 such that ∀a ∈ A, ∀x ∈ RN
+, ∀˜ `, ˜ `0, ua(x+ W1, ˜ `) > ua(x, ˜ `0).
If all agents play honest strategies and choose the target characteristics for their group
types in the deterministic state (x,µ,σ), then the resulting distribution on ˜ µ is degenerate.
Theorem 8.1 Suppose willingness to pay for strategies is bounded and that tW induces
honesty. If nonrandomness is eﬃcient, then there is an equilibrium state (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ)
that is Pareto optimal.
Proof We will prove the stronger result that there is such an equilibrium with constant
prices p. In this equilibrium the random group formation model plays no role, and we will
supress the notation for it for simplicity.
We ﬁrst show that there is an equilibrium of the residual-claimanteconomy (x,µ,σ),(p,q),f
in which σ is honest, beliefs f are on honest strategies, and prices p are constant.
Consider an artiﬁcial economy derived from the residual claimant economy in which
all memberships in Mc are veriﬁable. This can be modeled by constraining σ to be hon-
est. Notice that with this restriction, |Mc| = | ˜ Mc|. Theorem 6.1 establishes that in
the artiﬁcial economy, there is an equilibrium with beliefs on membership characteristics,
(x,µ,σ),(p,q),f, in which x is constant, p is constant, and beliefs f are, correctly, on hon-
est strategies. In every random matching, almost every agent receives his chosen list, and
because characteristics are veriﬁable, they match the target strategies stipulated as part of
the group type.
Now consider the true residual-claimant economy. The equilibrium of the artiﬁcial
economy is also an equilibrium of the true residual-claimant economy, together with honest
strategies and beliefs on honest strategies. No agent can improve on playing the honest
strategy. If any agent deviates from the honest strategy, either by choosing a characteristic
other than the target characteristicor by misreporting the strategiesof others, he ispunished
by paying W1. This makes him worse oﬀ because of (12). In particular, the support of
η(µ,σ) is the subset of Lists( ˜ Mc) such that ˜ `(ms,θ) = 1 if and only if `(ms) = 1 and sθ = s.
46To establish that there is no deterministic state that Pareto dominates (x,µ,σ), suppose
to the contrary that the state (x0,µ0,σ0), is deterministic and Pareto dominates. Then,







≥ ua (xa, ˜ µa)
for almost every a ∈ A, with strict inequality for a set of agents A0 ⊂ A with positive
measure.
Since (x,µ,σ) is an equilibrium state of the economy and (x0,µ0,σ0) and (x,µ,σ) entail
honest strategies, ˜ µatW = ˜ µ0
atW = 0 for almost all a ∈ A. Therefore, since (x,µ,σ),(p,q),f
is an equilibrium,
p · x0
a + q · µ0
a ≥ p · ea + p · µat
and ∀a ∈ A0,
p · x0
a + q · µ0















p · µatdλ(a) (13)
By consistency, and because each agent consumes a single augmented list with probability
one, Z
A




































which contradicts feasibility. The result now follows.
Theorem 8.1 implies that there is an eﬃcient equilibrium, provided eﬃciency can be
achieved in a deterministic state. The followingexample illustratesa limitationof thisresult:
a deterministic equilibrium can be Pareto dominated by an equilibrium with randomness.
Example 11: An equilibrium with randomness can Pareto-dominate a deter-
ministic equilibrium
In the primitive economy there is a single group type g with two memberships, M(g) =
{B,G}, where B denotes blue and G denotes green (both veriﬁable). For each membership,






. These can be
interpreted as meaning that each color comes in two unveriﬁable shades: blue can be either
47turquoise or navy, and green can be either lime green or forest green. The expanded set of
group types in the residual-claimaint economy is Gc = {gGLBT,gGLBN,gGFBT,gGFBN}.
All agents have the same endowment of a single private good, e > 1. Agents a ∈ [0,1/4)
can take no membership or a B membership, with agents a ∈ [0,1/8) having characteristic
BT while agents a ∈ [1/8,1/4)are BN. Agents a ∈ [1/4,1/2)can takeno memberhsip or a G
membership, with agents a ∈ [1/4,3/8) having characteristic GL while agents a ∈ [3/8,1/2)
are GF. Agents a ∈ [1/2,1] can take no membership or the residual claimant membership.
The measure of groups that will form is at most 1/4.
The utility of an agent who does not take a membership or takes a residual claimant
membership is equal to the consumption of the private good. For agents in B or G mem-
berships, utility is given by
ua(x,`) =

    
    
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where private goods consumption is x ∈ R+ and u : R+ → R+ is strictly concave, with
u(e) > e. Notice agents prefer to join groups if the price is zero.
We describe two equilibria. First, there is a deterministic equilibrium with honest
strategies and beliefs on honest strategies. In this equilibrium, the measure of each type
of group in Gc is 1/16. All B agents take B memberships, and all G agents take G
memberships. A measure 1/4 of agents in [1/2,1] take residual claimant memberships.
Prices for memberships will make all agents indiﬀerent among all memberships. Speciﬁcally,
let b > 0 satisfy








= −b qGF BT
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GF￿










= b qGF BT
￿
BT￿




In this equilibrium it does not matter how the agents are matched, because each agent gets
utility ¯ u := u(e − b) + 1 = u(e + b).
In the second equilibrium, strategies are not honest, and agents do not believe in honest
strategies. In each group type gs, each agent chooses to report the target characteristics
48proﬁle s regardless of the unveriﬁable characteristics that actually materialize. Because all
agents report the target characteristics, there are no internal transfers. There is no sorting
in the choice of group memberships. Each agent with a membership G has the belief
f(BT;G) = f(BN;G) = 1/2, and each agent in membership B has the belief f(GL;B) =
f(GF;B) = 1/2. In equilibrium, the agents with each unveriﬁable characteristic are divided
equally between the memberships available to them, and every agent is indiﬀerent among
the memberships available to him. Thus, these beliefs are correct in equilibrium.






(u(e) + 1) = u(e) +
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9 Lotteries and Eﬃciency
We showed that a residual-claimant economy has an eﬃcient equilibrium, provided the ef-
ﬁcient state does not involve randomness. However, example 11 shows that randomness
might improve eﬃciency in some settings. Although randomness arises naturally in exam-
ple 11 from the unveriﬁability of characteristics, veriﬁability is not the root issue. Cole and
Prescott (1997) showed that randomness can improve eﬃciency even where all the charac-
teristics are veriﬁable. The root issue is that consumption choices (group memberships) are
indivisible.
In this section we introduce lotteries into the model by deﬁning a class of lottery
group types. Our lotteries diﬀer from those of Cole and Prescott (1997) and Prescott
and Townsend (2006) (denoted CPPT below) in several ways. First, the lotteries of CPPT
are played in the population as a whole. Instead, our lotteries are played in ﬁnite groups.
Second, our lotteries are on lists of memberships rather than on memberships, so that
agents can correlate membership outcomes. The CPPT model does not need to address
this problem, because agents are constrained to consume a single membership. Third, the
CPPT lotteries are supplied by a proﬁt-maximizing intermediary serving a continuum of
agents. By selling to a continuum of agents, the intermediary can clear markets and bal-
ance its budget, even though the outcomes of the agents’ randomizations are independent.
Instead we incorporate randomization in ﬁnite lottery group types. The outcomes in our
49lottery group types are not independent (although outcomes are independent across lottery
groups), and each ﬁnite lottery group balances its budget. This has the advantage that we
do not need a distinguished type of ﬁrm that serves the whole economy (or a continuum
within the economy). At the same time, it limits the eﬃciency gains of allowing for lotteries.
We deﬁne a lottery group type such that the random outcome of the lottery generates
a consistent set of memberships. We start with a set of lists L, each list in Lists(M).
The set L may contain duplicate copies of some lists. Say that L is consistent if there are
nonnegative integers {α(g) : g ∈ G} such that
P
`∈L `(m) = α(g) for each m ∈ M(g) and
g ∈ G. A lottery membership is a function l : L → {0,1}, where l(`) = 1 is interpreted
to mean that the lottery member l would accept the list ` ∈ L. Thus, the membership l
designates a collection of lists, each of which would be acceptable to the member. Given a
consistent set of lists L, let ML be a set of lottery memberships.
A lottery is a pair (L,ML) such that
1. L is consistent
2. for every ` ∈ L, l(`) = 1 for at least one l ∈ ML
3. |L| = |ML|
4. 0 / ∈ ML
It is understood that the lottery group type will assign members to lists randomly, with
an equal probability on each assignment that is consistent with the memberships. More
speciﬁcally, a lottery assignment for the lottery (L,ML) is a one-to-one map γ : ML → L
such that γ (l) = ` only if l(`) = 1. Because γ is a one-to-one map, every list in L is assigned
to some member. Write Γ(L,ML) for the set of all lottery assignments, and write |Γ(L,ML)|
for the cardinality.
Write Γ(l,`;L,ML) for the set of lottery assignments in which the member l ∈ ML is
assigned to ` ∈ Lists(M), and write |Γ(l,`;L,ML)| for the cardinality. Then the proba-
bility that an agent with membership l ∈ ML is assigned to ` ∈ Lists(M) is the fraction of
assignments where that happens, namely, |Γ(l,`;L,ML)|/|Γ(L,ML)|.
To illustrate, consider a lottery in which every member would be willing to take every
list, that is, l(`) = 1 for each member l ∈ ML and each list ` ∈ L. The probability that
a given member l is assigned to a given list ` is calculated as follows. If |ML| = K, the
number of lottery assignments is the number of permutations of members, K!. The number
of lottery assignments where l is assigned to ` is (K − 1)!. Thus, the probability that l is
assigned to ` is 1/K = |Γ(l,`;L,ML)|/|Γ(L,ML)| = (K − 1)!/K!.
Consider another lottery in which L = {`a,`b,`c} and ML = {l1,l2,l3}, where l1(`) = 1
for ` = `b,`c, l2(`) = 1 only for ` = `c, and l3(`) = 1 for ` = `a,`c. There is a single lottery
50assignment, which must then occur with probability one. The probability that l1 is assigned
to `b is 1, even though this member is willing to accept `c as well, since no other member
is willing to accept `b. Lottery membership l2 must be assigned to `c, and that leaves only
`a as a feasible assignment for l3.
A natural conjecture is that with suﬃciently large lottery group types, equilibria might
be approximately eﬃcient. We leave this for future work.
Appendix
To prove Theorem 6.1, we adapt the proof of existence of group equilibrium in EGSZ (1999,
2005) to account for randomness in augmented groups and beliefs on memberships.
We begin with a formal deﬁnition of constant-price equilibrium, making use of the ﬁnite-
dimensional reformulation of the agent’s problem from section 6.
Deﬁnition 9 A constant-price group equilibrium with beliefs on membership characteris-
tics consists of a feasible state (x,µ,σ),R(µ,σ), constant private goods prices p ∈ RN
+ with
p 6= 0, membership prices q ∈ RM, and beliefs on membership characteristics f such that
(E1), (E7), and (E8) hold, where:
(E7) Optimization by agents: For almost all a ∈ A, if (x0
a,µ0
a,σ0




Wa(xa,µa,σa;f), then there exists ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M) with n(˜ `;µa,σa,f) > 0 such that
p · x0
a(˜ `) + q · µa > p · ea + p · (˜ `t)
(E8) Beliefs are correct: f(·;m) = ¯ φ(µ,σ)(·;m) for each m ∈ M such that ζ (m;µ) < 1.
Proof of Theorem 6.1: We will show that a constant-price equilibrium with beliefs on
membership characteristics exists.
For each a ∈ A, deﬁne a budget set ˆ B(a,p,q;f) ∈ (RN
+)Lists( ˜ M) × Lists(M) × Σ and
demand set da(p,q;f) ∈ (RN
+)Lists( ˜ M) × Lists(M) × Σ as follows.
ˆ B(a,p,q;f) := {(xa,µa,σa) ∈ ˆ Xa : p · x0
a(˜ `) + q · µa ≤ p · ea + p · (˜ `t)
∀ ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M) such that n(˜ `;`, ˆ σ,f) > 0}
da(p,q;f) = arg max
(xa,µa,σa)
Wa(xa,µa,σa;f)
s.t. (xa,µa,σa) ∈ ˆ B(a,p,q)
Following EGSZ (2005), write
Cons = {¯ µ ∈ RM : ¯ µ is consistent }
51Trans = {q ∈ RM : q · µ = 0 for each µ ∈ Cons}
Assume without loss that λ(A) = 1. By assumption, aggregate endowment ¯ e is strictly
positive and individual endowments are uniformly bounded above; say that ¯ e ≥ w1 >> 0








There is a bound, say Wt, such that |˜ `t| ≤ Wt1 for all ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M). Let W = We + Wt.
The technique of this proof is to deﬁne a sequence of economies k = 1,2,..., each with
an augmented set of agents, such that an equilibrium exists and equilibrium prices are
strictly positive for each economy in the sequence. We then argue that the limit of these
equilibria is a quasi-equilibrium of the true economy, and that equilibrium can be assured
by using the assumption of irreducibility.
Step 1 We construct the kth economy Ek. Fix an integer k > 0. Choose a family
{Ak
m : m ∈ M} of pairwise disjoint intervals in R, each of length 1/k. Set





The agent space for the perturbed economy Ek is (Ak,Fk,λ), where Fk is the σ-algebra
generated by F and the Lebesgue measurable subsets of ∪m∈MAk
m, λk is λ on A and
Lebesgue measure on ∪m∈MAk
m. Note that λk(Ak) = 1 +
|M|
k . External characteristics,
consumption sets, endowments and utility functions of agents in A are just as in the original
group economy E. For agents a ∈ Ak
m, we deﬁne:
Xa = RN
+ × {` ∈ Lists(M) : `(m) = 1,|`| = 1} × Σ
ea = W1
ua(x, ˜ `) = |x| for all (x, ˜ `)
Step 2 We have enlarged the economy in such a way that market-clearing private-goods
prices must be bounded away from zero, and market-clearing membership prices must be
bounded. This is because the demand functions of the added agents are such that, for
commodity prices near the boundary of the simplex and for membership prices that are
large in absolute value, aggregate excess demand for commodities will be impossibly large.
Write M∗ = max{|M(g)| : g ∈ G}. Choose a real number ε > 0 so small that













Having chosen ε, choose a real number R > 0 so big that R > 2|˜ `t| for all ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M)
and
[1 − (N − 1)ε]
￿
R









52Of course ε and R depend on k, although we supress the notation. Deﬁne a price simplex
for private goods and a bounded price set for group memberships:




pn = 1 and pn ≥ ε for each n}
QR = {q ∈ Trans : |qm| ≤ R for all m ∈ M}
Step 3 We deﬁne an aggregate excess demand correspondence together with a belief
correspondence. The aggregate choices of private goods, memberships and strategiesdepend
on both prices and beliefs, and the belief correspondence maps agents’ membership and
strategy choices into beliefs.
For each m ∈ M(g) and (µ,σ) : A → Lists(M) × Σ, deﬁne the belief correspondence
Φ(m;µ,σ) := ζ(m;µ)∆(S−m(g))+ [1 − ζ(m;µ)] ¯ φ(µ,σ)(·;m)
At a ﬁxed point of the mapping we construct below, µ must be consistent, so that, for each
m, ζ(m;µ) is either 0 or 1, where ζ(m;µ) is the probability of not matching into a group.
At such a ﬁxed point, for any membership m such that ζ(m;µ) = 1, beliefs can be any
selection from ∆(S−m(g)), and for memberships m with ζ(m;µ) = 0, beliefs are given by
the empirical distribution.
Deﬁne ¯ z : ∆ε × QR × F → RN
+ × RM × F by







˜ `∈Lists( ˜ M)
h
xa(˜ `) − ˜ `t
i







π(·;m) ∈ Φ(m;µ,σ) for each m ∈ M(g),
where (xa,µa,σa) ∈ da(p,q;f) for all a ∈ A}
The quantity z is aggregate expected excess demand. We argue in step 6 that z also
equals the aggregate excess demand.
We claim that ¯ z is upper hemicontinuous. To that end, observe that endowments are
bounded, group inputs and outputs are bounded (there are a ﬁnite number of input/output
vectors h(g,s)), private good prices are bounded away from 0 and group membership prices
are bounded above and below; hence the individual excess demand functions
(a,p,q,f) 7→
X
˜ `∈Lists( ˜ M)
h
xa(˜ `) − ˜ `t
i
n(˜ `;µa,σa,f) − ea
(a,p,q,f) 7→ µa
53are uniformly bounded. This correspondence is also measurable and upper hemi-continuous
since endowments are assumed to be desirable.
Let (pn,qn,fn) → (p,q,f), and (zn, ¯ µn,πn) ∈ ¯ z(pn,qn,fn) for each n such that (zn, ¯ µn,πn) →
(z, ¯ µ,π). We must show that (z, ¯ µ,π) ∈ ¯ z(p,q,f).
By deﬁnition, for each n there exists (xn
a,µn
a,σn


















πn(·;m) ∈ Φ(m;µn,σn) ∀m
Because demands are uniformly bounded and upper hemicontinuous, for each a there exists
(xa,µa,σa) ∈ da(p,q,f) such that (xn
a,µn
a,σn





xa(˜ `) − ˜ `t
￿







Now it suﬃces to show that π(·;m) ∈ Φ(m;µ,σ) for each m. To see this, ﬁx m ∈ M(g). If
ζ(m;µ) = 1, Φ(m;µ,σ) = ∆(S−m(g)) 3 π(·;m). Thus suppose ζ(m;µ) < 1. In this case,
for each m0, λ(Am0) > 0. Since µn → µ, without loss of generality take λ(An
m0) > 0 for each
n and m0 ∈ M(g), where An
m0 := {a ∈ A : µn
a(m0) = 1}. Using a version of Fatou’s lemma,















a ∈ A : σn
a,ˆ m = s ˆ m,µn









a ∈ A : σn
a,ˆ m = s ˆ m,µn





¿From this and the deﬁnition of Φ, we conclude that π(·;m) ∈ Φ(m;µ,σ) as desired.
Aggregate excess demand lies in a compact set. Individual income comes from selling
endowments, possibly from receiving subsidies for group memberships, and from transfers
within groups. The value of each individual’s endowment is bounded by We and the value
of transfers in the groups he joins is bounded by Wt. Thus, he can spend no more than
54W = We + Wt on consumption. Because group membership prices lie in the interval
[−R,+R] and individuals can choose no more than M group memberships, subsidies for
group memberships are bounded by MR. Because private good prices are bounded below
by ε, individual demand for each private good is bounded above by 1
ε(W + RM), and
individual excess demand for each private good lies between −W and 1
ε(W + RM). Hence
aggregate excess demand for private goods lies in the compact set
X = {x ∈ RN : −λ(Ak)W ≤ xn ≤ λ(Ak)
1
ε
(W + RM) for each n}
Because individuals are constrained to demand at most M group memberships, aggregate
demands for memberships lie in the set




¯ µ(m) ≤ λ(Ak)M}
Step 4 We complete the construction of a correspondence for which ﬁxed points are
equilibria by deﬁning the correspondence Υ : ∆ε×QR×X ×C ×F → ∆ε×QR ×X ×C ×F
by
Υ(p,q,f,z, ¯ µ)
= [argmax{(p∗,q∗) · (z, ¯ µ) : (p∗,q∗) ∈ ∆ε × QR}] × ¯ z(p,q,f)
Υ is an upper hemi-continuous with compact convex values. Hence Kakutani’s ﬁxed point
theorem guarantees that Υ has a ﬁxed point.
A ﬁxed point gives a price pair (pk,qk) ∈ ∆ε × QR, beliefs fk ∈ F, and quantities
(zk, ¯ µk,fk) ∈ ¯ z(pk,qk,fk) such that
(pk,qk) · (zk, ¯ µk) = max
h
(p∗,q∗) · (zk, ¯ µk) : (p∗,q∗) ∈ ∆ε × QR
i
Walras’s law implies that (pk,qk) · (zk, ¯ µk) = 0. Notice also that, provided ¯ µ is consistent,
beliefs will be correct at a ﬁxed point for all groups that form in equilibrium.
The ﬁxed point ensures that the beliefs on memberships f are correct; that is, f(·;m) =
¯ φ(µ,σ)(·;m) for memberships that are taken by a group of agents with positive measure.
Step 5 We show in several steps that zk = 0 and ¯ µk ∈ Cons, that is, the state of the
economy at a ﬁxed point is feasible.
Step 5.1 We show ﬁrst that qk·¯ µk = 0. Suppose not. We obtain a contradiction by looking
at excess demands at prices pk,qk of agents in Ak\A. Because 0·¯ µk = 0, maximalityand the
deﬁnition of Υ imply qk · ¯ µk ≥ 0. Maximality entails that qk ∈ bdyQR so that |qk
m| = R for
some m ∈ M. Budget balance for group types means that if some price has large magnitude
and is positive then some other price must have large magnitude and be negative. Thus
there is a membership m∗ such that qk
m∗ ≤ −R/M∗. An agent b ∈ Ak
m∗ could obtain a
55subsidy of R/M∗ by choosing the membership m∗ and no other. Such an agent, ﬁnding all
private goods to be perfect substitutes and deriving no utility from group memberships, will
consume only the least expensive private good(s) and group memberships with non-positive
prices. Because R > 2|˜ `t| for each ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M), the wealth used on inputs to groups is
less than R
2 . Thus b’s demand for the least expensive private good— which we may as well




2NM∗ for each ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M)
Because λ(Ak
ω) = 1/k and individual excess demands are bounded below by −W1, aggregate











n ≥ −W(1 +
|M|
k
) if n > 1
Deﬁne p ∈ ∆ε by:
pn =
￿
1 − (N − 1)ε if n = 1
ε if n > 1
(14)
It follows that
p · zk ≥ [1 − (N − 1)ε]
￿
R









Our choices of R,ε guarantee that the right side is strictly positive, so
(p,0)· (zk, ¯ µk) > 0 = (pk,qk) · (zk, ¯ µk)
which contradicts maximality. We conclude that qk · ¯ µk = 0, as desired.
Step 5.2 We show next that ¯ µk ∈ Cons. If not, we could ﬁnd a pure transfer q∗ ∈ Trans
such that q∗ · ¯ µk > 0 and hence could ﬁnd q∗∗ ∈ QR such that q∗∗ · ¯ µk > 0, contradicting
maximality.
Step 5.3 We claim that pk
n > ε for each n. Suppose not. We once again obtain a
contradiction by considering the excess demand of agents b ∈ Ak \ A. As before, we note
that each such agent will consume only the least expensive private good(s) and group
memberships with non-positive prices. It follows that b’s demand for the least expensive




for all ˜ ` ∈ Lists( ˜ M)












n ≥ −W(1 +
|M|
k
) if n > 1
56Deﬁning p as in (14), it follows that













Our choice of ε guarantees that the right side is strictly positive so
(p,0)· (zk, ¯ µk) > 0 = (pk,qk) · (zk, ¯ µk)
which again contradicts maximality. We conclude that pk
n > ε for each n.
Step 5.4 We show that zk = 0. Notice that (pk,qk) · (zk, ¯ µk) = 0 and qk · ¯ µk = 0 so
pk · zk = 0. Hence, if zk 6= 0 there are indices i,j such that zk
i < 0 and zk
j > 0. Deﬁne ˆ p by












ˆ pn = pk
n for n 6= i,j
Because pk
i > ε, it follows that ˆ p ∈ ∆ε. Because pk · zk = 0, it follows that ˆ p · zk > 0, a
contradiction to maximality. We conclude that zk = 0.











˜ `∈Lists( ˜ M)
h
xk
a(˜ `) − ˜ `t
i
n(˜ `;µa,σa,f) − ea

dλ(a) = 0
Since µ is consistent, almost every agent’s chosen memberships result in matches. Fur-
ther, f (·;m) = ¯ φ(µ,σ) (·;m) for every membership chosen by a set of agents of positive
measure. It follows that, for almost every agent a ∈ A, n(˜ `;µa,σa,f) = ¯ η(µ,σ)(˜ `;µa,σa) =







˜ `∈Lists( ˜ M)
h
xk
a(˜ `) − ˜ `t
i
¯ η(µ,σ)(˜ `;µa,σa) − ea

dλ(a) = 0
At the selections (xk
a,µk
a,σk
a), agents are optimizing. Since the ﬁxed point ensures consis-
tency, for feasibility it only remains to show that material balance holds when zk = 0. The
argument above is not quite enough, since it shows only that aggregate expected demand
is zero – not that aggregate demand is zero. Setting xk
a(v) = xk
a(˜ `) for each v ∈ Va(˜ `), this
















57By Corollary 2.10 of Sun (2006), for P (µ,σ)-almost all v ∈ V the aggregate demand at v
































Together the previous equalities yield (3).
Step 7 To argue that the limit of the equilibria as k → ∞ is a quasi-equilibrium of the
original economy, we must argue that the membership prices qk stay bounded. They are
bounded by R, but R depends on k. We now replace the sequence (qk) by a bounded
sequence (¯ qk) that leads to the same demands.
Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we may assume without loss that for each ` ∈
Lists(M) the sequence (qk·`) converges to a limit G`, which may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. Write:
L = {` ∈ Lists(M) : qk · ` → G` ∈ R}
L+ = {` ∈ Lists(M) : qk · ` → +∞}
L− = {` ∈ Lists(M) : qk · ` → −∞}
Choose ¯ G ∈ R so large that |qk · `| ≤ ¯ G for each k, each ` ∈ L.
Deﬁne the linear transformation T : Trans → RL by T(q)` = q · `. Write ran T =
T(Trans) ⊂ RL for the range of T and kerT = T−1(0) ⊂ Trans for the kernel (null space)
of T. The fundamental theorem of linear algebra implies that we can choose a subspace
H ⊂ Trans so that H ∩kerT = {0} and H +kerT = Trans. Write T|H for the restriction
of T to H. Note that T|H : H → ran T is a one-to-one and onto linear transformation, so
it has an inverse S : ran T → H. Because S is a linear transformation, it is continuous, so
there is a constant K such that |S(x)| ≤ K|x| for each x ∈ ran T.
Using Lemma 7.2 of EGSZ (1999), there exists a constant R∗ and k0 so large that k ≥ k0
implies
qk · ` > +2K ¯ GM + W if ` ∈ L+
qk · ` < −2K ¯ GM −
W
R∗ if ` ∈ L−
Write ST for the composition of S with T. For each k ≥ k0 set
¯ qk = ST(qk) − ST(qk0) + qk0 ∈ Trans
58Because S,T|H are inverses, the composition TS is the identity, so
T(¯ qk) = TST(qk) − TST(qk0) + T(qk0) = T(qk)
We assert that for k > k0, ¯ µk
a 6∈ L− ∪ L+ for any a ∈ Ak. If a ∈ Ak then qk · ¯ µk
a ≤ W
(because the expenditures are bounded by W) so ¯ µk
a 6∈ L+, by construction of L+. Since
{¯ µk
a} are strictly balanced and qk ∈ Trans, it follows from Lemma 7.2 in EGSZ (1999) that
mina∈Ak{qk · ¯ µk
a} ≥ − 1
R∗ maxa∈Ak{qk · ¯ µk
a} ≥ − W
R∗, and hence ¯ µk
a 6∈ L− by the construction
of L−.
Choose k1 ≥ k0 so that qk·` < qk0·`−2KGM for all ` ∈ L− and all k > k1. We claim that
for k > k1, (xk, ¯ µk,σk),(pk, ¯ qk),fk is an equilibrium for Ek. Because (xk, ¯ µk,σk),(pk,qk),fk
is an equilibrium, it suﬃces to show that, for almost all a ∈ Ak the choice (xk
a, ¯ µk
a,σk) is
budget feasible and optimal at (pk, ¯ qk,fk). We have shown above that ¯ µk
a ∈ L for almost
all a; by construction ¯ qk · ` = qk · ` for all ` ∈ L because T(¯ qk) = T(qk). Hence choices




a). Budget feasibility of (y,ν,s) at (pk, ¯ qk,fk) implies that ¯ qk ·ν ≤ W
and hence qk0 · ν ≤ W + 2K ¯ GM because |ST(qk)| ≤ K ¯ G and |ST(qk0)| ≤ K ¯ G. Thus
ν / ∈ L+. For ` ∈ L− and k > k1, we similarly obtain ¯ qk · ` > qk0 · ` − 2K ¯ GM > qk`. Thus,
¯ qk · ` ≥ qk · ` for ` ∈ L−. Hence, ¯ qk · ` ≥ qk · ` for ` ∈ L− ∪ L. Thus, budget feasibility of




not optimal at (pk,qk,fk). Thus (xk, ¯ µk,σk),(pk, ¯ qk),fk must be an equilibrium in Ek.
Step 8 Finally we argue that the limit of equilibria is a quasi-equilibrium of the original
economy, and also an equilibrium. By construction, |¯ qk·`| ≤ 2K ¯ GM+|qk0·`| for k > k0 and
all lists `, so the prices of lists are bounded. Because singleton memberships are themselves
lists, it follows that (¯ qk) is also a bounded sequence in Trans, and fk is bounded. We
thus have bounded sequences (pk), (¯ qk), (fk),(¯ µk). Passing to a subsequence if necessary,
we may assume that pk → p∗ ∈ ∆, ¯ qk → q∗ ∈ Trans, fk → f∗ ∈ F, ¯ µk → ¯ µ∗ ∈
Cons. The sequences (¯ µk) and (fk) are uniformly bounded, hence uniformly integrable,
so Schmeidler’s version of Fatou’s lemma (see Hildenbrand (1974, p. 225)) provides a
measurable mapping (x∗,µ∗,σ∗) : A → (RN
+)Lists( ˜ M) × RM × Σ such that (i) for almost
all a ∈ A: (x∗
a,µ∗
a,σ∗




agent a’s quasi-demand set; that is, there does not exist a strictly preferred (x0,`0,σ0) ∈ ˆ Xa
that is budget feasible at (p∗,q∗,f∗) and strictly cheaper; (iii)
R
A[x∗
a − ˜ µ∗
at]dλ ≤ ¯ e; (iv)
R
A µ∗
a dλ = ¯ µ∗. Conditions (i) and (ii) together imply that for almost all a, (p∗,q∗)·(x∗
a,µ∗
a)−
p∗ · ˜ µ∗
at = p∗ · ea. That is, left over goods (if any) are free. Distributing these free goods
arbitrarilyyields a quasi-equilibrium (x∗∗
a ,µ∗
a,σ∗




a),(p∗,q∗),f∗ is an equilibrium for E, so the proof is complete.19
19Because utility functions are strictly monotone in private goods, no goods are free at equilibrium, so in
fact there are no leftover goods to distribute.
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